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ABSTRACT
Unreliable access to electricity is the norm rather than the exception in many
developing countries. This dissertation analyzes the causes and consequences of outages
and evaluates the economic benefits of addressing them. The first chapter investigates how
the demand for electricity reliability can be estimated in the absence of markets for it.
Employing two complementary pieces of information from a nationally representative
sample of grid-connected consumers in Nepal - coping behavior and stated willingness to
pay (WTP) - demand electricity reliability is estimated. The results indicate substantial
heterogeneity in ex-ante demand for reliability and ex-post increase in electricity
consumption levels, even within the same tariff categories. For policy-making purposes,
the findings highlight the importance of conducting a detailed analysis of information on
households’ preferences and firms’ opportunity costs when evaluating the benefits from
reliability investments.
Chapter two focuses on evaluating the economic benefits of mitigating the risk of
unplanned outages in overloaded electric networks. Although electric utilities meter the
amount of electricity consumed by individual customers, the physical structure of
electricity distribution networks creates a shared level of reliability. The question that arises
here is whether the shared nature of electric networks makes them susceptible to the
common-pool resource (CPR) problem. Using firm- and substation-level data from a
nationally representative sample of Nepalese firms, the findings indicate that the CPR
problem would be largely solved if private firms were allowed to own and operate

ii

substations. The cost-benefit analysis presented in this chapter demonstrates that the annual
gain from eliminating this restriction would be on the order of 0.32 USD million.
The third chapter estimates the extent to which electricity consumers of different
income levels would increase their use of high-load appliances in response to
improvements in grid reliability. The results indicate that although grid-connected
households are counted in the electrification statistics, unreliable electricity service
significantly constrains their electric appliance ownership and, consequently, electricity
consumption. Putting this paper’s findings into Sustainable Development Goal 7’s
perspective, a connection to the grid by itself does not necessarily translate to realized
benefits from electricity consumption. The availability and reliability of the service play a
critical role for households at all income levels.
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CHAPTER 1
THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF UNSUPPLIED ELECTRICITY: EVIDENCE
FROM NEPAL
1.1 Introduction
During the past decade, extending access to electricity has been a priority for many
governments and international development organizations. As of 2018, significant progress
has been made in this regard: the world’s population living without electricity has
decreased from 1.2 billion in 2010 to 789 million people in 2018 (World Bank, 2020).
However, these electrification rates do not adequately capture the degree of usability of
available electricity for “electrified” consumers. There are many instances in which
households and business enterprises receive electricity with frequent and long
interruptions. Unreliable electricity service adds coping expenditures to electricity utility
bills and reduces electricity consumption levels, leading to an overall reduction in the
potential benefits of having uninterrupted access to electricity (Bhatia and Angelou, 2015)1.
On the supply side, upgrading the generation capacity and maintaining the electricity
supply infrastructure can improve reliability, but it requires capital investments. The costs
of such investments are expected to be covered, at least partly, by revenues for the electric
utility to remain financially sustainable. Thus, understanding consumers’ willingness to
pay for improved reliability provides critical information to utility managers,
policymakers, and investors when assessing investments’ costs-recovery potential. On the

1

In this paper, reliability refers to the ability of the power system to maintain the delivery of
uninterrupted electric service to customers in the face of uncertainty in operating conditions.
1

demand side, the first step is to clarify why some consumers value electricity reliability
more than others. In energy-poor contexts, a concrete step towards understanding drivers
of the demand for electricity reliability and uptake of off-grid backup sources is an analysis
of associations between household- and firm-level characteristics and electricity
consumption.
Due to the lack of market mechanisms to allocate electricity reliability in many
developing countries, the economic value of electricity reliability cannot be directly
observed. Previous studies have used two approaches to measure the demand for reliability:
the stated preference approach and the revealed preference approach (Carlsson and
Martinsson 2008; Reichl et al., 2013; Ozbafli and Jenkins, 2015; Ozbafli and Jenkins, 2016;
Oseni, 2017; Morrissey et al., 2018; Carlsson et al., 2020; Niroomand and Jenkins 2020a;
Niroomand and Jenkins 2020b)2. Depending on data availability and the plausibility of a
model’s assumptions in a given setting, revealed or stated preference approaches had been
used interchangeably (Klytchnikova and Lokshin, 2009). Given that each of these
approaches provides a different subset of insights about how different categories of
consumers value electricity reliability and what characteristics explain different valuations
for reliability, it would be informative to analyze the results generated by the two
approaches simultaneously. However, there is no such empirical evidence in the existing
literature of electricity reliability.

2

The stated preference approach elicits willingness to pay for improvements directly through a
contingent valuation or a choice experiment survey, while the revealed preference approach uses
data derived from the actual choices consumers make to cope with unreliable service and the real
expenditures associated with these choices.
2

This paper fills this gap by investigating two distinct demand-related variables,
revealed coping behavior and stated WTP, using a rich nationally-representative sample of
1,800 residential and 590 non-residential electricity customers in Nepal3. In principle,
coping behavior to deal with power outages and stated WTP for reliability improvements
related manifestation of the same underlying preferences for electricity reliability.
Nonetheless, there are essential differences between the two: coping expenditures represent
the economic value of non-incremental benefits from direct resource cost-saving, i.e., a
lower bound for WTP for a well-functioning grid (Devicienti et al., 2004). Stated WTP
values, on the other hand, reflect the economic value of incremental benefits (i.e.,
additional consumption) in terms of additional induced demand due to supply availability.
The findings indicate that although those in higher quartiles of residential electricity
bills invest substantially more in coping equipment than those in lower quartiles, the stated
WTP for reliability improvements diminishes as one moves from lower quartiles to higher
quartiles. The coping behavior of non-residential consumers shows a similar pattern to
residential ones, but their stated WTP values do not: industrial consumers state WTP values
for improvements two and four times of WTP stated by domestic and commercial
consumers, respectively. A closer look at the adoption pattern of coping equipment reveals
that these differences can be explained by the substitutability of electricity service provided
by the coping equipment.

3

The survey used in this study is conducted by the Millennium Challenge Corporation in
partnership
with
the
government
of
Nepal.
For
more
information
visit
https://data.mcc.gov/evaluations/index.php/catalog/194/study-description.
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Moreover, the obtained ex-ante WTP values indicate that consumers under the
industrial electricity tariff category have the highest demand for electricity reliability,
followed by those under commercial and domestic tariff categories. Nepal has managed to
eliminate seasonal shortages in its hydropower generation since 2017 by increasing its
electricity imports from India. This change is used to compare the ex-ante predictions to
the ex-post electricity consumption levels. As predicted by ex-ante WTP estimates,
industrial consumers show the highest increase in electricity consumption after
improvements.
This study contributes to the previous literature in several ways. First, it uses a
nationally representative sample of electricity customers compromising of both residential
and business customers. Earlier studies on the microeconomics of electricity reliability in
developing countries have focused only on either residential or business customers, and
they have been limited to small samples of customers with the number of observations
limited to a few hundred4. The only exception at the time of this study is Deutschmann et
al. (2019) that evaluates the willingness to pay for reliable electricity for a nationallyrepresentative sample of Senegalese households and firms. Consistent with Deutschmann
et al. (2019), this paper’s findings highlight that the costs of unsupplied electricity and
consumers’ behavioral changes after reliability improvements are widely different across
and within various consumers’ categories.

4

For instance, Ghosh et al. (2017) uses a sample of 260 small-scale firms in Hyderabad, India.
Similarly, Oseni (2017) uses a sample of 835 Nigerian households from only two regions, Lagos
and Osun.
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Second, previous studies have only analyzed the ex-ante predicted demand for
electricity reliability, and there is no empirical evidence on how consumers actually
respond to reliability improvements ex-post. This paper provides the first empirical
evidence on how responses vary across and within different categories of consumers.
Understanding which category of consumers is most likely to benefit from reliability
improvements can help policymakers to better target reliability investments and allocate
resources where they are needed the most.
Third, given the chronic nature of electricity reliability in low-income countries, this
study’s findings would be relevant to policymakers in these countries. Without
understanding the current and future demand for electricity, making socially optimal
investment decisions and effective planning for sustained supply of electricity is impossible
(De Nooij et al., 2007). While some consumers have high latent demand for fully reliable
electricity service (such as industrial consumers with heavy equipment), others have lower
demand levels (e.g., low-income households with demand only for lighting purposes). In
the absence of markets for electricity reliability, the value of unsupplied electricity should
be assessed carefully depending on the consumer mix in a given region to avoid under- or
over-estimating WTP values (Sullivan et al., 2010). Otherwise, the outcome will be
increasing electricity provision to those who do not seek it, leading to a less efficient
allocation of electricity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the previous
literature on the unreliability of electricity supply. Section 1.3 describes the data and
methodology, followed by the theoretical model’s description in Section 1.4. The empirical
5

results are then discussed in Section 1.5. The robustness of estimated WTPs is tested in
Section 1.6. Section 1.7 lists the conclusions of the paper.
1.2 Related literature on unreliable electricity supply
For many countries in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, an unreliable electricity
supply is a norm rather than the exception. Public electric utilities in these countries are
severely capital-rationed, and electricity rates are heavily regulated. Electricity rates are
not only maintained below the long-run cost of generation plus transmission and
distribution, but they also cannot be adjusted when seasonal shortages exist. The
consequence of this practice is a deterioration of the electricity reliability that imposes costs
and inconvenience on electricity consumers. Previous literature documents that
intermittent electricity service results in revenue losses for firms due to under-utilization
of production capacity and inconvenience for households due to inability to utilize their
desired energy services (Steinbuks and Foster 2010; Alby et al., 2012; Chakravorty et al.,
2014; Fisher-Vanden et al., 2015; Allcott et al., 2016; Samad and Zhang, 2016; Falentina
and Resosudarmo, 2019; Bajo-Buenestado, 2020).
When electricity is an essential input for a firm’s operation, empirical evidence
suggests that an unreliable supply can adversely affect its productivity. Allcott et al. (2016)
analyze the impact of electricity shortages caused by the seasonality of hydropower
availability on large manufacturing firms in India. Their findings reveal that India’s
electricity shortages have reduced the average firm’s revenues by 5 to 10 percent.
Similarly, Grainger and Zhang (2019) evaluate the cost of electricity shortages for
manufacturing firms in Pakistan. They estimate that an additional average daily hour of
6

unexpected power outages decreases a firm’s annual revenues by 10 percent, decreases
annual value-added at the firm level by 20 percent, and increases the labor share of output.
These impacts highlight the significant role of having access to reliable power
infrastructure on economic growth (Andersen and Dalgaard, 2013).
The opportunity cost of unsupplied electricity for firms can be measured by the value
of forgone production per kWh of unsupplied electricity. An accurate estimation of
opportunity cost requires access to detailed operating accounts of business enterprises
(Hashemi et al., 2018). In the absence of such data, the stated WTP values can approximate
a firm’s actual WTP value for a reliable electricity supply. By analyzing the relationship
between the estimated WTP and observable characteristics of firms, we can better
understand firms’ decision-making when it comes to coping with the unreliable supply of
electricity.
The welfare impacts of intermittent electricity supply are not limited only to nonresidential consumers. Ozbafli and Jenkins (2016) use the choice experiment method to
evaluate households’ WTP for improved electricity service in North Cyprus. Their findings
show that households are willing to pay premia of 3.6 percent and 13.9 percent of their
current electricity bills for summer and winter, respectively, to get uninterrupted service.
Similarly, Oseni (2017) estimates the WTP of a sample of Nigerian households for
improved reliability of grid-supplied electricity. The findings indicate that households are
willing to pay more on top of their monthly bills for reliable service, and WTP is
significantly higher for those households who have already adopted backup diesel
generators.
7

After identifying the causes and impacts of unreliability, the next challenge is to
evaluate potential solutions. Various responses are available to electric utility companies
and policymakers (Gertler et al., 2017). In the long run, investments in generation,
transmission, and distribution capacities, as well as institutional reforms, can ensure that
the electric grid satisfies the increasing demand for reliable electricity. In the short run,
pricing mechanisms can help manage demand by adjusting electricity prices when load
curtailment is required. Time-of-day tariffs (also known as peak-load pricing) can shift
consumption during peak times toward users with the highest marginal benefits.
Interruptible electricity contracts provide rebates to users that choose to accept outages
during periods of peak demand. Finally, quantity rationing can be employed through load
shedding programs, a system in which the power supply is interrupted to different areas for
non-overlapping periods.
In Nepal, the electricity utility company is a state-owned vertically-integrated
monopoly with regulated electricity tariffs. Quantity rationing (also known as load
shedding) has been the method of dealing with seasonal electricity shortages. The efficient
energy allocation to ration this excess demand is to provide the available energy to those
valuing it the most, those with the highest opportunity cost of unsupplied power. With no
system for identifying the value placed by individual customers on each unit of energy
received, however, the utility company curtails power arbitrarily to different groups of
consumers or makes a judgment by its own priority system of where the energy is least
valued. Timilsina et al. (2018) estimate the economy-wide costs of load shedding Nepal
faced using a computable general equilibrium model. Their findings indicate that annual
8

gross domestic product would have been 7 percent higher than it was during 2008–16 if
there had been no load shedding.
1.3 Data and methodology
1.3.1 Electricity Supply in Nepal
Hydropower represents 90 percent of the total installed generation capacity in Nepal,
mostly run-of-the-river type. With river flow being governed by the monsoon and dry
seasons, Nepal experiences significant generation declines during the dry season5. Figure
1.1 depicts the variation in total hydroelectricity generation during 2016, the year in which
the survey data used in this paper were collected. The average monthly rainfall drops
significantly between the two seasons (Panel A), leading to a sharp drop in hydropower
generation (Panel B). The installed capacity in 2016 was 856 MW, whereas peak demand
amounted to 1,385 MW. This resulted in a 534 MW of power deficit with daily outages of
up to 11 hours during the dry season. Figure 1.2 shows the hydroelectricity generation
pattern during the five years before 2016, confirming that this pattern is not unique to 2016.
In response to low hydropower generation levels during the dry season, Nepal
Electricity Authority (NEA), the central government-owned generator, grid operator, and
distributor, curtails power supply to all customers through a rationing program known as

5

Only 14% of the total installed capacity is in the form of dam storage-type hydropower
installations. These dams can store water for long periods and use it to continue full generation
during the dry season when run-of-river types reduce output due to lower river flows. However,
most of the hydropower projects in Nepal as of the time of this study are run-of-river types because
storage-type dams are significantly costlier at least for two reasons: (a) storage-type dams require
substantial submergence of forest and agricultural land; and, (b) Himalayan rivers in Nepal contain
large quantities of sediment with hard abrasive particles that reduce the lifespan of reservoirs by
decreasing storage capacity (Thapa et al., 2005).
9

load shedding. This program assigns all grid-connected consumers to different groups and
cuts their electricity during specific hours of the day that are announced ahead of time. To
reduce the extent of the load shedding, Nepal has relied on electricity imports from India6.
Electricity imports have increased threefold since 2010, from 638 GWh in 2010 to 1,777
GWh in 2016 (NEA, 2017). Due to insufficient cross-border transmission capacity, Nepal
has not fully benefited from India’s electricity trade to eliminate its domestic power
deficits7.
1.3.2 Household data
The household sample used in this study contains 1,800 grid-connected households
across Nepal. The survey design team took various measures to ensure that households’
data were selected randomly and nationally representative (see Appendix A for more detail
about national-representativeness). First, to avoid selection bias against the most remote
rural areas, a GIS-based household selection was followed in rural areas. Similarly, a GIS-

6

An alternative for imports would be developing domestic storage-type hydropower projects. The
cost of electricity imports from India is projected to range from NPR 5 to 9 per kWh, but the
projected cost of electricity generated by domestic storage projects is more than NPR 10 per kWh
from (World Bank, 2019a). This is why developing domestic storage projects are not economically
feasible at the current level of demand in Nepal despite the high potential of hydropower capacity.
Moreover, another advantage of power trades with India is that Nepal will be able to export its
surplus capacity to India during the rainy season.
7

In 2011, the construction of Nepal-India Electricity Transmission and Trade Project (NIETTP)
started with financing from the World Bank and a group of international development
organizations. The main aim of this project was to increase the cross-border transmission capacity
between India and Nepal to facilitate electricity trade between the two countries. Nepal will be able
to export its surplus power to India during the monsoon season and to import from India during the
dry season in order to eliminate load shedding. In the results section, this project is used to
investigate whether the estimated WTP values among electricity consumers for reliability
improvements would map into changes in electricity consumption after improvements by NIETTP.
10

based Random Start or Fanning method was used in the urban areas, based on a sample
frame obtained from the NEA.
Also, to ensure that the sample is nationally representative, the same sampling strategy
used by Nepal’s bureau of statistics and the World Bank is employed. Geographically,
Nepal is divided into three ecological regions: Mountain, Hill, and southern flat land called
Terai (see Figure 1.3). The Mountain region accounts for 35 percent of the country’s total
land area, while Hills and Terai accounting for 42 percent and 23 percent, respectively. The
Terai zone contains 50 percent of the total population, while Hill and Mountain have 43
percent and 7 percent, respectively.
Any ward belonging to a Village Development Committee (VDC) as per the 2011
census (the latest available at the time of the survey) was treated as a rural location, and
any ward belonging to a Municipality/Sub-metropolitan/Metropolitan city as an urban
ward. The final sample is achieved by splitting the country into four strata: Rural Hills,
Rural Terai, Urban wards outside Kathmandu Valley, and Urban Kathmandu Valley8. A
sample of 400 households is allocated for each stratum except for the urban locations
outside Kathmandu Valley, where a sample of 600 households is allocated (i.e., a total of
1,800 interviews)9.

8

Kathmandu Valley comprises urban areas in the districts of Kathmandu (the capital city), Lalitpur
and Bhaktapur. Outside Kathmandu comprises all other urban areas – municipalities (cities and
towns) – located outside of the Kathmandu Valley.
9

Outside-Kathmandu Valley stratum had been oversampled to ensure a sufficient sample allowing
for any differences in electricity consumption within the urban locations across Nepal other than
urban areas in Kathmandu Valley.
11

Table 1.1 reports the descriptive statistics of the households’ sample10. All of the
surveyed households were connected to the national electricity grid at the time of the
survey11. Urban households constitute 56 percent of the sample, with 22 percent residing
within the Kathmandu Valley. Of the 44 percent of the rural population, exactly half reside
in Terai, with the other half residing in mountainous regions. Survey enumerators collected
information about the average monthly electricity bills of households by observing the
electricity bills. The survey also collected information about possible demand-shifting
sociodemographic characteristics of households such as income, education of the
household head, number of household members, number of rooms in the house, number of
children of school age (6-14 years old), and ownership of TVs, radios, and computers.
Unscheduled interruptions in electric service and fluctuations in voltage constrain the
use of high-voltage appliances (such as refrigerators, televisions, and computers) and result
in a malfunction of appliances. The survey finds that households engage in various coping
behaviors when electricity from the grid is not available or when there are fluctuations in
the voltage of electricity drawn from the grid.

Tables 1.1 and 1.2 do not report the descriptive statistics of respondents’ stated WTP. Later in
the paper, Tables 1.3 and 1.4 represent descriptive statistics of stated WTPs for the household
sample and the firm sample, respectively.
10
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By 2016, 72% of Nepalese households were connected to the national grid, whereas 23% are
connected to off-grid sources (such as solar), and 5% of the households have no access to electricity
in any form (World Bank, 2019b).
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In addition to the descriptive statistics for the whole sample, Table 1.1 also reports the
descriptive statistics by quartiles of the electricity bills12. Those data indicate that
households are mostly rural in the lower quartiles while most households in the higher
quartiles are urban. Also, income varies within all quartiles of electricity bills; energy-poor
households are not necessarily income-poor.
Another interesting pattern in Table 1.1 is the adoption of alternative power sources
across quartiles of electricity bills. Solar panels, solar lanterns, torch lights, emergency
lights, and candles show a similar uptake pattern across all electricity-bill quartiles.
However, there is a distinct uptake pattern for inverters and kerosene: kerosene is mostly
adopted by the first and second quartiles of electricity bills. In contrast, inverters are the
preferred backup technology among consumers in the third and fourth quartiles.
1.3.3 Firms data
Similar measures were taken to ensure the quality of data collected from business
enterprises. The sample frame for business enterprises is provided by Nepal’s Inland
Revenue Department (IRD), segregated into service and manufacturing/industrial firms.
The same definition of businesses used by the IRD is used: “small” businesses have an
annual turnover (gross sales) of less than NPR 50 million (USD 0.47 million); and
“medium” businesses have an annual turnover between NPR 50 million and NPR 400

12

Using the electricity tariffs published in 2016 annual report by NEA, the KWh of electricity
consumed by each quartile of electricity bills can be approximated. The average monthly
consumption is less than 30KWh, 31-150 KWh, 151-400 KWh, and more than 400 KWh for the
1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th quartiles, respectively.
13

million (USD 0.47-3.8 million). Firms with an annual turnover greater than NPR 400
million (USD 3.8 million) are categorized as “large.”
The achieved sample size is 590 businesses: 340 industrial or manufacturing firms and
250 service-oriented firms, with 46, 38, and 16 percent of firms being small, medium, and
large, respectively (see Table 1.2). As in the household sample, the descriptive statistics
for the firms’ sample are reported by their electricity consumption intensity. There are three
main electricity tariff categories for business enterprises in the sample: domestic,
commercial, and industrial. On average, the monthly electricity bills of industrial
consumers are 24 times and 50 times more than the average monthly electricity bills of
commercial and domestic subscribers, respectively. Firms in the domestic tariff category
are mostly small and medium firms active in the service-oriented sectors.
Adopting coping technology among firms is different from households due to their
different demand for electricity. Firms often use electricity for purposes other than lighting,
such as running different equipment types, which is why we observe a higher adoption rate
of inverters and diesel generators among firms. The opportunity cost of unsupplied
electricity to most firms is so high that they self-generate electricity when the grid is down,
even though self-generated electricity is costlier and inferior to grid electricity in terms of
load (Burgess et al. 2019)13. The adoption rate of diesel generators increases as we go from

13

Some firms (those which are not operating 24 hours) might have the option of making up some
fraction of lost production time by working overtime and extra shifts (Wing and Rose, 2020). In
most cases, however, it is unlikely that a profit-maximizing firm would have an economic incentive
to engage in overtime production, unless the firm is constrained by contractual obligations
(Munasinghe and Gellerson, 1979). Also, it might be argued that firms can plan ahead of time by
keeping inventories during the dry season. Since the dry season lasts for a few months in Nepal,
14

the domestic tariff category toward the industrial tariff category. It is also observed that the
adoption of voltage stabilizers is more prevalent among firms than households, most likely
because firms have expensive equipment that is more sensitive to voltage fluctuations.
Some firms also use solar panels to cope with the unreliable supply of grid electricity, but
firms mostly use them in the domestic tariff category with low electricity demand.
1.3.4 Contingent valuation survey design, limitations, and potential biases
In a contingent valuation framework, two electricity reliability improvement
scenarios were proposed to the respondents. Respondents were asked to state how much
they were willing to pay on top of their current electricity bills for (i) 50 percent reduction
in the planned outages; (ii) 100 percent reduction in the planned outages 14. The survey
design provided a bidding process to elicit the respondents’ WTP for each proposed
improvement in a double-bounded dichotomous choice format. Using the answers and bids,
the mean WTP can be estimated by applying a double-bounded model (also known as
interval data model).

most firms would not be able to make required investments in physical planning or operate
profitably by keeping high stakes of inventories.
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Interruptions in electricity service are mainly categorized into planned and unplanned outages.
Scheduled or planned outages occur due to lack of capacity in generation and/or transmission
segments of electricity supply chain. Unplanned outages happen at the distribution level due to
different factors such as overloaded transformers and non-technical losses (such as theft and illegal
connections). While planned outages can be totally eliminated countrywide by upgrading the
upstream (generation and transmission) capacities, unplanned outages often require local solutions.
Identifying the type of outages without detailed data from the electric utility is an empirical
challenge. In Nepal, however, all electricity consumers can clearly distinguish planned outages
from unplanned ones because load shedding program has been a part of their lives for more than a
decade.
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The initial bid offer was generated as a random amount in NPR from zero to a hundred
percent of the respondent’s average monthly grid electricity bill. If the respondent agreed
that they would pay this initial amount (a “yes” response), then they would be asked if they
were willing to increase their payment in steps of 10 percent until the response was “no”.
If the response to the initial random bid was a “no”, then this initial bid was decreased in
steps of 10 percent of the respondent’s electricity bill until the respondent said “yes” to the
proposed amount.
Before starting the bidding process, a few quality measures are taken to reduce biases
that can be potentially introduced during a contingent valuation survey. A cheap-talk script
was read to the respondents about hypothetical bias, and respondents were asked to state
their WTP for the proposed policies “as if” those proposals would be implemented (see
Box B1 in Appendix B). Moreover, the script includes consequential features intended to
convey to respondents that their responses were of consequence and could eventually result
in real policy changes: ”…if you value electricity enough, the government may decide to
invest more in electricity, and your tariff may have to increase to pay for the investment.”15
Moreover, previous studies show that the payment vehicle — how respondents are
asked to pay for the reliability improvements — is also an important design issue in
contingent valuation surveys. If respondents do not believe the credibility of payment
vehicle, their responses may be biased (Gunatilake et al., 2007; Whittington and Pagiola,
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There is some evidence that cheap-talk and consequential scripts effectively reduce the
magnitude of hypothetical bias in the contingent valuation surveys (Cummings and Taylor, 1999).
16

2012). The valuation questions in this survey are designed to be asked from an ex-ante
perspective in the form of increments to current electricity bills. The questions target the
premium the respondent would be willing to pay in addition to current monthly bills to
have an improved electricity service. Given that all the surveyed households and firms are
already connected to the grid and are familiar with electricity bills as the payment vehicle,
this should not be of great concern.
Despite the application of contingent surveys in eliciting WTP values, the validity of
estimates by this method has been subject to criticism. This study tests the validity of the
results to the extent possible. For instance, one major concern with contingent valuation
studies is that they measure ex-ante demands based on hypothetical proposed situations.
Previous studies have pointed out that this hypothetical nature can lead to overestimating
the real WTP (Blumenschein et al., 1998; Penn and Hu, 2018). Although the possibility of
such bias cannot be ruled out in this analysis, it should not be of significant concern.
Respondents in the sample not only have experienced load shedding schedules announcing
planned outages for several years proceeding to the survey, but they also have a clear
understanding of how improvements in the reliability of electricity service would be. The
first proposed improvement is a 50 percent reduction in outages. This can be related to
when the dry season is coming to an end, and the load shedding schedule starts to disappear.
Similarly, the second proposed improvement is a total elimination of planned outages,
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which is the electricity supply status during the wet season when there is no load
shedding16.
Another concern is how accurately contingent valuation surveys reveal respondents’
“true” preferences and costs. In this study, to encourage respondents to focus on the
marginal benefits and costs, the survey questions were designed very carefully. The
questions asked, “how much additional to the current bill” customers would be willing to
pay instead of “how much of a tariff” they would be willing to pay for a reduction of
planned outages. This difference provides a set of comparable relative costs and benefits
and results in more reliable WTP estimates, expressing customers’ preferences and costs
more accurately (Ghosh et al., 2017).
The application of stated preference methods has also been associated with concerns
about ordering effects (Bateman et al., 2004). Although the possibility of this bias cannot
be completely ruled out in this analysis, the survey was designed and implemented in a
way that mitigated ordering effects bias to some extent. The respondents were aware that
a series of questions would be asked regarding their WTP. This process, known as
advanced disclosure, is shown to be an effective design factor in mitigating ordering effects
(Bateman et al., 2004; Aravena et al., 2012; Day et al., 2012).
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The possibility of delivering the proposed project and familiarity of respondents with the
proposed improvements do not necessarily translate into the elimination of hypothetical bias. The
main idea here is to highlight that respondents are very well familiar with the nature of planned
outages and can refer to their actual experiences when evaluating the proposed improvements.
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Finally, construct validity can be used to evaluate the accuracy of WTP responses
generated by the contingent valuation survey17. In this paper, a set of regressions is used to
examine the relationship between a respondent’s WTP and the observable characteristics
that are pointed out by economic theory as the plausible determinants of the WTP.
1.3.5 Empirical strategy
Given that respondents are presented with two bid levels, the second bid is contingent
upon a response to an initial bid (𝐵𝑖 ). If the response to the initial bid is yes, the second bid
is higher (𝐵𝐻 ); otherwise, it is lower (𝐵𝐿 ). Thus, there are four possible outcomes: yes-yes,
no-no, yes-no, and no-yes. The likelihoods of these outcomes are denoted by 𝜋 𝑦𝑦 , 𝜋 𝑛𝑛 ,
𝜋 𝑦𝑛 , and 𝜋 𝑛𝑦 , respectively,
𝜋 𝑦𝑦 (𝐵𝑖 , 𝐵𝐻 ) = Pr(𝐵𝑖 ≤ 𝑊𝑇𝑃∗ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵𝐻 ≤ 𝑊𝑇𝑃∗ ) = Pr(𝐵𝐻 ≤ 𝑊𝑇𝑃∗ )
(1)
=1−𝐺

𝑊𝑇𝑃∗

(𝐵𝐻 ; 𝜃)

𝜋 𝑛𝑛 (𝐵𝑖 , 𝐵𝐿 ) = Pr(𝐵𝑖 ≥ 𝑊𝑇𝑃∗ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐵𝐿 ≥ 𝑊𝑇𝑃∗ ) = Pr(𝐵𝐿 ≥ 𝑊𝑇𝑃∗ )
(2)
= 𝐺𝑊𝑇𝑃∗ (𝐵𝐿 ; 𝜃)
𝜋 𝑦𝑛 (𝐵𝑖 , 𝐵𝐻 ) = Pr(𝐵𝑖 ≤ 𝑊𝑇𝑃∗ ≤ 𝐵𝐻 ) = 𝐺𝑊𝑇𝑃∗ (𝐵𝐻 ; 𝜃) − 𝐺𝑊𝑇𝑃∗ (𝐵𝑖 ; 𝜃)

(3)

𝜋 𝑛𝑦 (𝐵𝑖 , 𝐵𝐿 ) = Pr(𝐵𝑖 ≥ 𝑊𝑇𝑃∗ ≥ 𝐵𝐿 ) = 𝐺𝑊𝑇𝑃∗ (𝐵𝑖 ; 𝜃) − 𝐺𝑊𝑇𝑃∗ (𝐵𝐿 ; 𝜃).

(4)
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Construct validity refers to how well the measurement is predicted by factors that one would
expect to be predictive a-priori, i.e. the consistency of survey results with the predictions of
economic theory.
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𝐺𝑊𝑇𝑃∗ (. ) is the cumulative distribution function of the 𝑊𝑇𝑃∗ . Given a sample of n
respondents and the bids 𝐵𝑖 , 𝐵𝐿 , and 𝐵𝐻 , the log-likelihood function of the double-bounded
model takes the following form,
𝑛

ln 𝐿 (𝜃) = ∑

𝑦𝑦

𝑦𝑛

{𝑙𝑖 𝑙𝑛𝜋 𝑦𝑦 (𝐵𝑖 , 𝐵𝐻 ) + 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑛 𝑙𝑛𝜋 𝑛𝑛 (𝐵𝑖 , 𝐵𝐿 ) + 𝑙𝑖 𝑙𝑛𝜋 𝑦𝑛 (𝐵𝑖 , 𝐵𝐻 )

𝑖=1

(5)
𝑛𝑦

+ 𝑙𝑖 𝑙𝑛𝜋 𝑛𝑦 (𝐵𝑖 , 𝐵𝐿 )},

yy

yn

ny

where li , lnn
i , li and li are binary variables and θ is a vector of parameters of interest.
In the double-bounded model, the maximum likelihood estimation directly estimates the
parameters of interest. Once the estimated parameters are obtained, we can estimate
households’ WTP18.
1.4 Theoretical model
Suppose there are two types of electricity consumers, low demanders, and high
demanders; and, two states of the world, dry season with a frequency of planned outages
𝜑 and monsoon season without planned outages. High demanders are those consumers
whose WTP for uninterrupted electricity service justifies investments in high-quality
backup sources such as diesel generators and inverters. Low demanders are those
consumers whose WTP only justifies adopting low-quality backup services such as
kerosene and candles when the grid is down.
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The doubleb Stata command developed by Lopez-Feldman (2012) is used for estimation.
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The question is to what extent consumers are willing to pay for incremental electric
system reliability improvements that eliminate seasonal outages. Panel A in Figure 1.4
shows the situation for a high demander. When the supply is unconstrained (i.e., during
monsoon season), sufficient generation capacity allows consumers to buy all their needed
power from the electricity utility company (Qu ) at the regulated electricity tariff (𝑃𝑅 ). When
supply becomes constrained (i.e., during dry season), however, consumers can only buy
electricity from the utility company during non-load-shedding hours (Q𝑐 ). Although high
demanders supplement the grid-supplied electricity with backup generators, the cost of
self-generation is greater than the utility company’s tariff. So, these consumers selfgenerate only up to a point (Qc + self) that is less than what they would have purchased from
the grid without any constraint (Qu ). If the reliability were improved, high demanders
would be willing to pay approximately the area (𝐴 + 𝐵 + 𝐶 + 𝐸) multiplied by 𝜑. In other
words, the WTP value will increase until a 100 percent reduction in outages is achieved.
For low demanders, depicted in Panel B of Figure 1.4, the situation is different. The
marginal cost of self-generation is sufficiently high that this group cannot justify
investments in generators. These consumers tend to use coping equipment other than
generators. However, the question is how they would respond to improvements. Assuming
that the initial frequency of planned outages is 𝜑0 , a partial improvement in the availability
of electricity service (−∆𝜑 < 𝜑0 ) is associated with a surplus gain of approximately
(−∆𝜑) × (𝐴 + 𝐶). Total elimination of planned outages (−∆𝜑 = 𝜑0 ) will result in even a
higher gain in consumer surplus because of the income effect from improved electricity
service (demand curve rotates outward from 𝐷0 to 𝐷1 ). Practically, improved reliability
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results in savings in the expected monetary costs of injuries by low-quality backup and
reduced leisure. The gross WTP for total elimination can, therefore, be approximated by
𝜑0 × (𝐴 + 𝐶 + 𝐺 + 𝐻 + 𝐼). This implies that this type also puts a higher value on the
quality of the additional improvement that eliminates the uncertainty associated with power
outages.
The theoretical model suggests that respondents are expected to state higher WTP for
electricity reliability improvements until full reliability is achieved. This behavior is
consistent with the real-world observation of consumers’ behavior when coping with
unreliable public electricity provision. When the national grid is down, consumers lack
equivalent perfect substitutes. Provision of electricity is different from other public
domains such as water supply. Installing home water treatments when the water supply is
unreliable may be sufficient to solve consumers’ water problems. In that case, the
substantial sunk costs may alter the consumer’s behavior regarding the provision of an
improved water supply. Therefore, the consumer may not be willing to pay for
improvements (Devicienti et al., 2004).
However, in the case of electricity supply, although consumers invest in alternative
power sources, they do so to the equivalent of electricity autarky (off-grid alternative
sources of power), with costs far more than grid electricity (due to scale economies in grid
supply) and with power loads less than a well-functioning grid (Burgess et al., 2019).
Therefore, those who invested in coping equipment may be willing to pay even more than
those who have not.
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1.5 Empirical results
Table 1.3 reports the mean estimated WTP of households in the sample. The results
show that households incur on average a premium almost as much as their average monthly
grid-electricity bills (95 percent) in the form of coping expenditures. Looking at the
estimated WTP values based on the quartiles of electricity bills, it is apparent that such
expenditures are relatively higher for households with lower consumption levels: those in
the first quartile incur coping expenditures 1.6 times more than their electricity bills,
whereas those in the fourth quartile report expenditures 0.4 times of their bills.
While the magnitude of estimates is different, the stated WTP estimates for 50
percent and total elimination of outages show a similar pattern to the revealed WTP
estimates across quartiles19. An interesting pattern reveals when looking at the breakdown
of total WTP values. Although a 50 percent reduction in outages in each step theoretically
provides equal units of electricity, households value the second increment differently. The
incremental WTP for 100 percent reduction varies across different quartiles of bills (row
2b in Table 1.3). Households in the first quartile are willing to pay a further 74 percent of
their current electricity bills, while those in the fourth quartile are willing to pay only an
additional 40 percent.
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In the sample of households, 4 percent of respondents (72 respondents) stated zero willingness
to pay for service improvements. Looking at the observable characteristics of this group, it is clear
that zero bids are stated by those at lower income categories. So, it is assumed here that these
bidders represent valid zero bids rather than protest zeros, which would arise if respondents have
stated a zero WTP even though their true valuation was positive.
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The same exercise is repeated for the firms’ sample (see Table 1.4)20. The average
coping expenditures for a representative firm amounts to a premium of 79 percent on the
electricity bill. Once the sample is split by electricity tariff categories, a pattern of scale
economies in off-grid coping expenditures is observable among firms, with the relative
coping expenditures of industrial firms being less than domestic and commercial firms’.
The stated WTP for a 50 percent reduction in outages by firms suggests a similar pattern
to the revealed WTP estimates among firms. However, the stated WTP for the total
elimination of planned outages indicates a change in the opposite direction: the average
WTP stated by firms with industrial tariffs is 50 and 30 percent greater than the WTP by
firms with domestic and commercial tariffs, respectively.
These obtained WTP estimates provide two insights about the cost of interruptions to
electricity consumers. First, the sustained availability of electricity is valued
heterogeneously between residential and non-residential consumers. Second, even within
the same category of consumers, the reliability of electricity service is valued differently.
The next step is to test the associations between the obtained WTP values and observable

In the firms’ sample, two percent of respondents (15 firms) stated zero willingness to pay for the
proposed improvements. Previous studies suggest that zero bids (also known as protest bids) should
be considered legitimate WTP bids when respondents value a proposed policy, as opposed to when
they value a commodity (McGuirk, Stephenson and Taylor, 1989; Oseni, 2017). Moreover, as
Carlsson and Martinsson (2007) argue, if there is no further information about the protest, they
should be treated as true zeros since we cannot rule out a WTP equal to zero. Following these
arguments, I included zero WTP responses by firms. The estimated WTP without zero responses
are, on average, 11 percent, 18 percent, and 15 percent lower for firms under domestic, commercial,
and industrial electricity tariffs, respectively. Moreover, I tested the robustness of the regression
coefficients represented in Table 1.7 by estimating a Tobit model. The Tobit model’s results
indicate that while the sizes of the coefficients change slightly, their signs do not show any
sensitivity to the regression model’s choice.
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characteristics of respondents to see what observable characteristics of electricity
consumers should be taken into account to avoid the increased provision of energy to those
who do not seek it.
Panels A and B in Figure 1.5 depict the regression coefficients by quartiles of
households’ electricity bills and firms’ electricity tariff categories, respectively. The
absolute value of stated WTP by households in higher quartiles of electricity bills does not
significantly differ from those in lower quartiles. The relative WTP values, however,
decrease significantly from lower to higher quartiles. At first glance, this might imply that
households in higher quartiles put a lower value on improvements in the electricity system
reliability. However, this counterintuitive finding can be explained by a closer look at the
resale value of coping equipment and the coping equipment’s adoption patterns across
quartiles.
Households in higher quartiles of electricity bills are more likely to invest in inverters
and voltage stabilizers (see Table 1.6). Among available backup technologies, only
inverters have enough capacity to power large-load appliances (e.g., refrigerators and
washing machines) beyond lights, radios, and mobile phone chargers. Also, voltage
stabilizers can insure the large-load sensitive electric appliances against voltage
fluctuations. With such complementary off-grid equipment, high-demand households are
able to consume almost as much as electricity units they desire even without proposed
improvements. For them, the inconvenience may be simply rescheduling powerconsuming activities. These technologies are also associated with high sunk investment
costs and most likely have a low ratio of resale value to purchase value. A fully reliable
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grid, however, provides a reliability level above and beyond any equipment. Thus, higher
quartile households are willing to pay a positive but smaller fraction of their current bill to
reduce outages further.
On the other hand, given the low demand for electricity services among lower quartiles
of bills, their WTP for reliable electricity is insufficient to cover the high upfront and
routine maintenance costs of inverters and voltage stabilizers. Hence, it is not surprising
that lower quartile households are more likely to use kerosene to cope with unreliable
electricity service (see Table 1.6). However, kerosene provides low-quality lighting with
an expected possibility of burn injuries for household members (Daltrop and Mulqueeny,
2010). Also, they cannot turn on the radio or TV or charge their mobile phones during
blackouts. Therefore, they might be willing to pay a relatively higher fraction of their
current bill to eliminate outages’ risks and inconvenience.
In Panel B of Figure 1.5, it is shown that an incremental improvement in reliability
from 50 percent to 100 percent is valued more by both commercial and industrial firms,
but only statistically significant for industrial firms. This behavior among firms can be
explained by the nature of coping behavior among industrial firms. As shown in Table 1.8,
industrial firms invest in backup generators and voltage stabilizers because of their needs
for higher loads and their equipment’s high sensitivity to voltage fluctuations. The
reliability level that these consumers require cannot be provided by other off-grid
equipment such as intermittent solar panels. However, the cost of running backup
generators is so high that these firms cannot operate 24 hours (as they usually do to avoid
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ramp-up times or to meet manufacturing requirements) if they decide to self-generate all
their required electricity.
When a 50 percent reduction in outages is proposed, these firms still need to keep their
installed backup capacity, but they save partially in generator’s operating costs (fuel for
generators). Given that industrial firms benefit from the economies of scale in selfgeneration, their savings in operating costs after service improvements are relatively less
than commercial and domestic categories. On the other hand, when outages due to
electricity shortages are entirely eliminated, firms may decide to remove all or a large
fraction of their installed backup capacity. In other words, they are not only able to save all
the operating costs, but they are also able to save substantially on the fixed capital costs as
well as high routine maintenance costs. These savings add up to potential increases in
revenues from higher utilization rates due to increased consumption of electricity services.
The value of these gains ranks industrial consumers first, with the highest WTP for outagefree electricity service.
The impacts of other household-level characteristics on WTP values are listed in Table
1.5. Household income is expected to correlate with electricity demand (Sievert and
Steinbuks, 2020) positively. Column 1 of Table 1.5 shows a positive correlation between
households’ electricity bills and income levels. This is most likely driven by the ownership
of high-power electric appliances (such as refrigerators and washing machines) that higherincome households use to do household chores. The relationship between income and WTP
for reliability follows the same pattern as the relationship between income and electricity
consumption.
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Also, households with at least one kid at school stated a higher WTP for reliability
improvements. As the household head’s educational attainment increases, the WTP for the
total elimination of outages increases. Lee et al. (2020) argue that the impact of
electrification is a direct function of a household’s ability to make complementary
investments to realize the potential benefits of electrification. Parents with school kids and
household heads with higher education attainment put a higher value on reliability because
more electricity reliability can increase their expected benefits from the investments they
have made in their kids and their education.
Similarly, other firm-level characteristics are expected to affect their current and future
electricity demand once reliability is improved. As represented in Table 1.7, firms under
commercial and industrial electricity tariff categories currently consume significantly more
electric power than domestic ones. Firm size is a predictor of current electricity demand
and absolute WTP for improvements. And, firms located in rural areas state a significantly
higher WTP for the total elimination of outages, both in absolute and relative terms.
1.6 Comparing ex-post electricity consumption with predictions of ex-ante WTP
estimates
The Nepal-India Electricity Transmission and Trade Project (NIETTP) was proposed
in 2011 to expand cross-border transmission capacity between India and Nepal. With the
development of different phases of NIETTP, Nepal has been able to import additional
power from India from 2017. NEA has been able to serve the residential consumers without
any load shedding since 2017. Non-residential load shedding, however, continued partially
until early 2018, when the project became fully operational. The survey used in this study
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is conducted right before this project came into service. The WTP estimates predict that
industrial consumers put the highest value on the sustained supply of electricity. The
validity of this prediction can be tested by ex-post changes in electricity consumption levels
after 2016.
In 2016, NEA served 3,257,812 customers, 93.8 percent under domestic tariff, 0.6
percent under commercial tariff, and 1.4 percent under industrial electricity tariff 21. Sales
to these three categories were more than 88 percent of total MWh sold by NEA, totaling
USD 0.4 billion of revenues. Domestic consumers comprise 42 percent of these revenues,
followed by industrial and commercial consumers with 35 and 11 percent, respectively.
Figure 1.6 depicts the electricity consumption growth index for domestic, commercial,
and industrial customers from 2010 through 2018, with 2016 as the base year22. Each year’s
index value is constructed as the ratio of GWh of electricity sold to each consumer category
in that year to GWh of electricity sold to that category in 2016. The index is also adjusted
for the growth rate in the number of consumers to ensure that it represents the average
change in consumption level for each category over time. Industrial customers have the
highest ex-post increase in electricity consumption, as predicted by the ex-ante WTP. This
finding is consistent with previous studies’ findings that grid expansion has an aggregate
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The other 4.2 percent included supply of power for public usage such as street lights, temples,
irrigation and water supply.
22

2018 annual report is the latest available electricity utility report as of the time this study is
being conducted.
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impact on industrial development (Kassem, 2018; Khanna and Rowe, 2020; Fried and
Lagakos, 2020; Perez-Sebastian et al., 2020; Fiszbein et al., 2020).
1.7 Conclusion
This study contributes to the growing discussions of how increased electricity
availability from new generation capacity or power imports can improve electrification
policies’ effectiveness in low-income, energy-poor contexts. These upstream energy
interventions can facilitate moving beneficiaries to relatively higher electricity
consumption tiers since the shortfall in electricity availability has locked them into a lower
tier of access despite being connected to the grid (Bhatia and Angelou, 2015). Using a
representative sample of electricity customers in Nepal, I find substantial heterogeneity in
ex-ante demand for an improved electricity supply and an ex-post increase in electricity
consumption levels, even within the same tariff categories.
The estimates reported in this paper indicate that focusing only on aggregate coping
expenditures or stated WTP for proposed improvement may lead to under- or overestimation demand for reliability among different categories of consumers. While energy
supplied by off-grid backup technologies can be used during periods of supply
interruptions, there is still inconvenience among electricity consumers caused by public
infrastructure’s insufficiency. Households need to reschedule their routine activities, and
firms cannot utilize their full capacity. The value of this remaining inconvenience is not
reflected in consumers’ coping expenditures and shows up only in the stated WTP values
when the survey respondents are asked to state their WTP for the additional increments to
reliability.
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For policy-making purposes, the findings highlight the importance of understanding
which categories of electricity customers will most likely benefit from electricity reliability
improvements. An unreliable supply of electricity from the grid can be expected to impose
varying levels of welfare cost depending on the household’s socioeconomic characteristics.
Similarly, business enterprises may be affected differently based on their opportunity costs
of unsupplied power. Thus, a detailed analysis of households’ preferences and firms’
opportunity costs is necessary for electricity utilities and policymakers to evaluate the
benefits from reliability investments properly. Even if investments cannot be made and
rationing has to be done, such information allows the decision making process for utilities
by ranking customer groups based on their costs of per kWh unserved when the electric
system load has to be shed, rather than making arbitrary allocations.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics for households’ sample
Quartiles of electricity bills

Whole
sample
(n=1,800)

1st
(n=450)

2nd
(n=482)

3rd
(n=418)

4th
(n=450)

5.73
(8.13)

0.76
(0.14)

1.93
(0.59)

4.59
(1.14)

15.82
(10.95)

5.14
(2.42)

4.91
(2.30)

4.89
(2.23)

5.22
(2.26)

5.58
(2.71)

5.59
(3.15)

4.15
(2.08)

5.00
(2.62)

5.50
(2.94)

7.75
(3.60)

Have at least one school kid (aged 6-14)

0.57

0.59

0.58

0.57

0.53

Owns a TV/radio
Owns a computer

0.85
0.35

0.64
0.08

0.86
0.28

0.94
0.38

0.98
0.68

Educational attainment of the household head
No formal education
Less than School Leaving Certificate (SLC*)
SLC
More than SLC

0.20
0.44
0.13
0.23

0.29
0.47
0.12
0.12

0.25
0.45
0.12
0.18

0.17
0.44
0.12
0.27

0.09
0.39
0.17
0.35

Household income
Category 1: Less than NPR 10K (USD 95)
Category 2: Between NPR 10K to 20K (USD 95 to 190)
Category 3: Between NPR 20K to 40K (USD 190 to 381)
Category 4: Between NPR 40K to 60K (USD 381 to 571)
Category 5: More than NPR 60K to 80K (USD 571)

0.07
0.23
0.37
0.21
0.12

0.16
0.35
0.30
0.11
0.07

0.05
0.27
0.42
0.18
0.07

0.03
0.21
0.40
0.23
0.11

0.01
0.09
0.35
0.31
0.22

Urban/rural status and ecological zones
Urban – Kathmandu
Urban – Outside Kathmandu
Rural – Terai
Rural – Mountain

0.22
0.34
0.22
0.22

0.02
0.24
0.27
0.46

0.18
0.27
0.32
0.23

0.23
0.44
0.22
0.10

0.45
0.39
0.06
0.09

Coping technology
Inverters
Solar panel
Solar lantern
Voltage stabilizer
Torch lights
Emergency lights
Candle
Kerosene

0.19
0.16
0.01
0.11
0.47
0.48
0.20
0.13

0.02
0.17
0.02
0.02
0.51
0.42
0.19
0.27

0.09
0.14
0.05
0.47
0.54
0.24
0.13

0.18
0.19
0.01
0.13
0.48
0.51
0.22
0.09

0.47
0.16
0.23
0.43
0.43
0.15
0.03

Variable

Monthly grid electricity bill
USD
Household characteristics
Number of household members

Number of rooms in the house

Standard deviation in parentheses.
* School Leaving Certificate (SLC) is the certificate given to those who pass a national exam at the end of grade 10.
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Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics for firms’ sample
Electricity Tariff Category

Whole
sample
(n = 589)

Domestic
(n = 144)

Commercial
(n = 153)

Industrial
(n = 292)

2,539
(6,122)

82
(168)

175
(5,272)

4,164
(7,432)

Firm size (based on annual gross sales)
Small
Medium
Large

0.46
0.38
0.16

0.67
0.31
0.02

0.58
0.33
0.09

0.29
0.43
0.28

Firm location
Urban
Rural

0.81
0.19

0.95
0.05

0.89
0.11

0.06
0.84

Adoption of coping technology
Inverter
Diesel generators
Voltage stabilizer
Solar panel

0.72
0.68
0.34
0.09

0.79
0.24
0.19
0.18

0.81
0.78
0.34
0.11

0.65
0.84
0.42
0.04

Variables

Monthly grid electricity bill
USD

Standard deviation in parentheses.
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Table 1.3: Estimated WTP values for households (percentage of monthly electricity bill)
Approach

Whole
sample

Method

Stated preference
(1)

(2)

(3)

Quartiles of monthly electricity bills
1st

2nd

3rd

4th

39.91

43.55

41.85

42.27

32.56

(1.09)

(3.06)

(2.09)

(2.03)

(1.79)

54.57

75.30

57.10

49.55

39.61

(1.07)

(3.29)

(2.08)

(1.80)

(1.44)

94.48

118.86

98.97

91.83

72.18

(2.08)

(6.67)

(4.29)

(3.44)

(2.76)

Contingent valuation
WTP for 50% reduction in planned
outages*

Incremental WTP for 100% reduction
in planned outages**

Total WTP for elimination of planned
outages

Figures in parentheses are standard deviations.
Notes:
* If a respondent chooses to pay an additional amount for 50% fewer outages, the base figure is calculated
as the current bill multiplied by the accepted offered value (the final accepted bid). For instance, if the current
bill is USD 50 and the respondent’s final accepted bid is 30%, the WTP value for 50% reduction in outages
is recorded as USD 15, or 30% of the current electricity bill (reported in row 1).
** If the respondent chooses to pay an additional amount for no outages in the follow-up question, then the
base figure is recorded as the current bill multiplied by random offered value plus recorded WTP for 50%
fewer outages. For instance, if the current bill is USD 50 and the final accepted bid for the total elimination
of outages is 60%, the WTP value for the total elimination of outages is recorded as USD 30 + USD 15 =
USD 45, or 90% of the current electricity bill (reported in row 3). The incremental WTP for 100% reduction
in outages is the difference between WTP values for 50% and 100% reduction in outages (reported in row
2).
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Table 1.4: Estimated WTP values for firms (percentage of monthly electricity bill)
Approach

Stated
preference

Whole
sample

Method

Electricity Tariff Category
Domestic

Commercial

Industrial

37.23

41.56

37.20

34.27

(1.87)

(3.21)

(3.70)

(2.83)

71.97

53.68

66.60

84.83

(2.45)

(2.94)

(4.68)

(4.11)

109.21

95.25

103.81

119.10

(4.96)

(4.93)

(9.29)

(8.73)

Contingent valuation
(1)

(2)

(3)

WTP for 50% reduction in planned outages

Incremental WTP for 100% reduction in planned
outages

Total WTP for elimination of planned outages

Figures in parentheses are standard deviations.
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Table 1.5: Determinants of current and future demand for electricity – households’
sample
Variables

Current demand
Log (current
electricity bill)
(1)

Absolute WTP – log(WTP)
50% reduction
100% reduction
in outages
in outages
(2)
(3)

Distribution of grid electricity bills
2nd quartile

Relative WTP (% of current bill)
50% reduction
100% reduction
in outages
in outages
(4)
(5)

- 0.58
(0.37)

0.11
(0.18)

- 0.14***
(0.03)

- 0.21***
(0.03)

3rd quartile

- 0.09
(0.40)

0.29
(0.20)

- 0.20***
(0.03)

- 0.31***
(0.03)

4th quartile

- 1.20***
(0.45)

0.26
(0.22)

- 0.38***
(0.03)

- 0.48***
(0.03)

0.19**
(0.08)

1.88***
(0.53)

0.90***
(0.26)

0.16***
(0.04)

0.13***
(0.04)

Category 3 (between USD 190 to 381)

0.25***
(0.08)

2.29***
(0.53)

1.42***
(0.26)

0.22***
(0.04)

0.24***
(0.04)

Category 4 (between USD 381 to 571)

0.43***
(0.09)

2.82***
(0.57)

1.71***
(0.28)

0.26***
(0.04)

0.28***
(0.04)

Category 5 (more than USD 571)

0.48***
(0.10)

2.35***
(0.63)

2.08***
(0.31)

0.25***
(0.05)

0.36***
(0.05)

Urban – Outside Kathmandu

- 0.15**
(0.06)

- 1.96***
(0.38)

- 0.96***
(0.19)

- 0.15***
(0.03)

- 0.10***
(0.03)

Rural – Terai

- 0.59***
(0.07)

- 1.84***
(0.46)

- 0.34
(0.23)

- 0.19***
(0.03)

- 0.05
(0.03)

Rural – Mountain

- 0.83***
(0.06)

- 5.68***
(0.44)

- 1.24***
(0.22)

- 0.46***
(0.03)

- 0.16***
(0.03)

0.06***
(0.01)

0.01
(0.05)

0.01
(0.02)

- 0.0005
(0.0048)

- 0.0007
(0.0046)

0.07***
(0.01)

0.13***
(0.05)

0.04*
(0.02)

0.009**
(0.004)

0.005
(0.003)

- 0.03
(0.04)

0.45*
(0.27)

0.17
(0.13)

0.04*
(0.02)

0.05**
(0.02)

Ownership of TV/Radio

0.44***
(0.06)

0.11
(0.38)

0.22
(0.19)

- 0.02
(0.03)

- 0.0006
(0.03)

Ownership of computer

0.48***
(0.05)

0.30
(0.32)

0.25
(0.16)

0.01
(0.02)

0.02
(0.02)

0.07
(0.05)

0.19
(0.33)

0.31*
(0.16)

0.03
(0.02)

0.06**
(0.03)

SLC

0.09
(0.07)

0.22
(0.48)

0.27
(0.22)

0.01
(0.03)

0.03
(0.03)

More than SLC

0.08
(0.06)

- 0.20
(0.41)

0.59***
(0.20)

- 0.01
(0.03)

0.11***
(0.03)

1,800

1,800

1,800

1,800

1,800

Household monthly income
Category 2 (between USD 95 to 190)

Urban/Rural status

Household characteristics
Number of household members

Number of rooms in the house

Have at least one school kid (aged 6-14)

Educational attainment of the household head
Less than SLC

Observations

* p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01. Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
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Table 1.6: Adoption pattern of coping equipment by quartiles of electricity bills (Probit
model)
Coping equipment
Variable

Inverter

Voltage stabilizer

Solar panel / solar
lantern

Torch/emergency
light/candle

Kerosene

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.06*

0.04

- 0.04*

0.02

- 0.07***

(0.03)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.01)

0.11***

0.10***

0.004

- 0.01

- 0.08***

(0.03)

(0.02)

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.02)

0.20***

0.14***

- 0.03

- 0.06**

- 0.12***

(0.03)

(0.02)

(0.03)

(0.03)

(0.02)

Controls

YES

YES

YES

YES

YES

Observations

1,800

1,800

1,800

1,800

1,800

Quartiles of electricity bills
2nd quartile

3rd quartile

4th quartile

* p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. Average marginal effects of Probit model are reported.
Controls include household monthly income categories, urban-rural and ecological status, household characteristics, and household head
educational attainment.
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Table 1.7: Determinants of current and future demand for electricity – firms’ sample
Current demand

Absolute WTP, log(WTP)

Relative WTP, % of the
current bill
50%
100%
reduction in
reduction in
outages
outages
(4)
(5)

(1)

50%
reduction in
outages
(2)

100%
reduction in
outages
(3)

1.92***
(0.15)

0.54
(0.74)

2.06***
(0.30)

- 7.27
(5.18)

7.35
(6.53)

Industrial

3.31***
(0.15)

1.17**
(0.73)

3.84***
(0.30)

- 13.15**
(5.96)

19.27***
(6.49)

Medium

0.67***
(0.13)

1.89***
(0.60)

0.92***
(0.25)

8.93**
(4.16)

1.75
(5.36)

Large

1.96***
(0.17)

3.25***
(0.82)

1.88***
(0.34)

14.96**
(5.72)

- 6.29
(7.35)

- 0.14
(0.15)

- 1.34*
(0.71)

1.02***
(0.31)

- 3.47
(4.96)

21.98***
(6.63)

589

589

589

589

589

Variable

Electricity Tariff category
Commercial

Log (current
electricity bills)

Firm size

Rural

Observations

* p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01. Note: Figures in parentheses are standard errors.

38

Table 1.8: Adoption pattern of coping equipment by firms (Probit model)
Variable

Diesel generator
(1)

Coping equipment
Voltage
Inverter
stabilizer
(2)
(3)

Solar panel
(4)

Electricity tariff category
Commercial

Industrial

0.36***

0.16***

0.03

- 0.04

(0.03)

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.03)

0.36***

0.22***

- 0.12**

- 0.12***

(0.03)

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.03)

0.12***

0.09**

0.02

0.04

(0.03)

(0.04)

(0.04)

(0.02)

0.22***

0.03

0.03

0.001

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.03)

0.07

- 0.04

- 0.04

- 0.04

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.05)

(0.04)

589

589

589

589

Firm size
Medium

Large
Firm location
Rural

Observations

* p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. Average marginal effects of Probit model are
reported.
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Panel A: Variation in average monthly rainfall in 2016

Panel B: Variation in hydroelectricity generation in 2016

Figure 1.1: Seasonal variations in average rainfall and hydroelectricity generation in 2016
Note: Months are categorized into monsoon and dry months. The first six months represent the monsoon season (Jestha
through Kartik in Nepalese calendar, mid-May through mid-Nov), and the second six months refer to the dry season
(Kartik through Baishakh in Nepalese calendar, mid-Nov through mid-May). Data sources: The rainfall data are from the
World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal. Monthly generation values are from Annual reports of the Nepal
Electricity Authority.
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Magh (mid-Jan to mid-Feb)
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Figure 1.2: Hydroelectricity generation in Nepal during 2011-2016

Source: Annual reports of Nepal Electricity Authority (https://www.nea.org.np/annual_report)

Figure 1.3: Ecological zones used for the sampling
Source: author’s demonstration based on the data from www.arcgis.com

42

Panel A: High demanders

Panel B: Low demanders

Figure 1.4: WTP for improvements in the reliability of the electricity service
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Panel A: households’ WTP by quartiles of electricity bills (reference category: 1st quartile)

Panel B: Firms’ WTP by electricity tariff categories (reference category: domestic)

Figure 1.5: Coefficients plot for households and firms by current consumption levels
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Growth index for GWh of electricity sold
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Figure 1.6: GWh of electricity sold over time (adjusted for growth in the number of
consumers, base year = 2016)
Note: The base year for growth index is selected as 2016 because: (a) the WTP survey was conducted in
2016; (b) load shedding for domestic consumers and all consumers have been eliminated since 2017 and
2018, respectively.
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CHAPTER 2
THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF MITIGATING UNPLANNED OUTAGES IN
OVERLOADED ELECTRIC DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS
2.1 Introduction
In many developing countries, insufficient investments or seasonal shortages in the
upstream segments of the electricity supply chain (generation and transmission) result in
long hours of electricity service unavailability (Zhang, 2018). Electric utilities in these
countries typically allocate the constrained supply of electricity among customers through
rationing programs (also known as load shedding programs). Outages caused by these
programs are called planned outages, and previous studies show that there is often a
significant willingness to pay among consumers to eliminate planned outages (Ozbafli &
Jenkins, 2016; Carlsson et al., 2020; Niroomand & Jenkins, 2020; Hashemi, 2021).
There are, in addition, situations where sufficient electricity is generated and
transmitted to distribution networks (the downstream segment of the electricity supply
chain), but frequent unplanned outages remain. Local substation failure due to capacity
overload is the most common cause of unplanned outages23. Electric utilities upgrade
substation capacities to keep up with growing demand over time and to prevent or reduce

23

A distribution substation is the last part of the electricity distribution network that ensures electric
power is adequately converted to a usable service voltage for the daily operations of consumers.
Each substation is designed for a specific maximum capacity, and the installed protection devices
automatically shut down the substation in the occurrence of an overload, leaving all consumers
connected to that substation without power. Thus, the frequency with which unplanned power
outages occur in a locality is a function of how much overloaded the distribution substations are in
that locality.
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overloading. The cost of such investments is recovered from adjustments to retail
electricity prices (EIA, 2017).
There is political pressure against higher electricity prices in many developing
countries’ electricity markets, and the situation gets worse where access to electricity is
increasingly viewed as a right. Unaccounted electricity usage (electricity theft) through
illegal connections and unpaid electricity bills becomes an accepted part of the system
(Burgess et al., 2020). Consequently, electric utilities’ cash flows deteriorate, and they
postpone essential investments to maintain service reliability (Gertler et al., 2017).
Distribution substations are not only essential parts of power distribution from an
electrical engineering perspective, but they also play a critical role in the economics of
power distribution. When reliability concerns are significant, the electric power drawn
from a substation has common-pool resource (CPR) aspects (Pless & Fell, 2017). Once
consumers are connected to the electric network, although their kWh consumption can be
individually metered it is impossible to precisely monitor their individual contributions to
overloading. The CPR problem arises when individual users draw electricity from a
substation without paying a market price that reflects the marginal cost of technical or
economic sustainability.
While CPR problems have gained significant attention in the management of natural
resources such as fishery, grazing areas, and forestry, research on electricity infrastructure
as a CPR has mainly been conceptual (Künneke & Finger, 2009) and rarely informed by
empirical evidence. This study uses a nationally representative sample of Nepalese firms
to investigate the extent to which electricity distribution networks face commons problems.
47

The ownership boundaries of substation configurations are used to identify how CPR
problems at local distribution substations affect the aggregate level of reliability, and to
estimate the extent to which private ownership of a substation enables a firm to mitigate
those problems.
The data analyzed in this paper indicate that firms with captive substations are less
likely to experience unplanned outages24. In particular, firms with private substations are
less likely than firms with shared substations to report the occurrence of unplanned power
outages. If these firms report unplanned outages, they are less frequent and have shorter
durations than those experienced by firms without their own substations. These findings
are then used to study the feasibility of investing in a captive substation for a firm (or a
group of firms) as a mitigation strategy to address outages caused by overloaded
substations. Estimates of the firms’ willingness to pay to reduce unplanned outages are
used to estimate the potential economic gains from deregulation of private substation
provision. I estimate that the benefits from deregulation of substation ownership would
generate substantial economic gains to Nepal’s economy, up to 18.17 USD billion as of
2016.
Understanding the heterogeneous impacts of outages and proposing practical solutions
to address them is useful to decision-makers when designing policies to address
distribution networks’ reliability issues. While expanding upstream generation and
transmission capacities can effectively eliminate planned outages, the situation for

24

A captive substation is a distribution substation used and managed by an industrial or commercial
electricity consumer for their own electricity consumption.
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addressing unplanned outages in the downstream segment is a fundamentally different
problem. The localized nature of these outages implies that the potential solutions should
also be local. Private investment in distribution substations by a firm or a group of firms is
a possible solution to the problems caused by local overloads.
2.2 Literature review: electricity reliability as a common-pool resource
Electricity distribution networks can be viewed as rivalrous but non-excludable
resources for at least three reasons (Künneke & Finger, 2009). First, electricity distribution
infrastructures are often spread over a vast geographical area with difficult-to-monitor
access points, making them susceptible to the actions taken by interconnected electricity
consumers. An example of such actions is the pilferage of electricity through illegal tapping
of the low-voltage distribution lines leaving a substation. Empirical evidence suggests that
electricity theft can adversely affect electricity reliability, which is why reducing electricity
theft has been recognized as one of the potential solutions for improved electricity
reliability (Jamil, 2013; Tang, 2014; PWC, 2016).
Another source of reduced local electricity reliability is present when a new enterprise
gains connectivity to a distribution substation that already bears a load equal to its rated
capacity. The new connection to an already-at-capacity substation leads to more outages.
Such a large new connection can only happen by bribing the electric utility authorities who
control access to such substations. The new enterprise will have found the bribe worthwhile
to obtain some grid-supplied electricity service of whatever quality given the high cost of
self-generated electricity, while the reliability of service is reduced for everyone connected
to that substation (Gertler et al., 2017; Pless and Fell, 2017). Energy sector assessment
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reports by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) highlight corruption as one of the
significant issues affecting electricity reliability (ADB, 2007; ADB 2009).
Third, even if grid access could be technically monitored, there might be politically
motivated universal-access obligations. Access to electricity is increasingly viewed as a
right across the developing world. In such an environment, illegal connections have
become an accepted part of the electricity distribution system (Burgess et al., 2020). This
social norm will eventually result in reduced reliability of the electricity distributed by the
utility. Those who are legally connected will have to pay higher electricity bills in order
for the utility to recover the costs of maintaining reliability. If retail electricity tariffs are
regulated and there is resistance to higher tariffs, the electric utility’s cash flow deteriorates,
leading the utility to postpone essential investments to maintain reliability, leading to
reduced reliability for all customers (ADB, 2011; Gertler et al., 2017).
Fourth, once users have entered the network, it might be difficult or even impossible
to determine the services they appropriate from it. Although individual kWh consumption
can be precisely metered, certain critical services to technically balance the electricity
network (i.e., load balancing, voltage control, and reactive power) cannot be. This rivalrous
nature of reliability is particularly prominent when the network is congested during peak
demand periods. There is a need for load management, voltage control, and reactive power
provision. However, different use patterns and the technical characteristics of users’
applications cause different demands for these services. Individual users extract these
services from the system without paying the full cost of their technical and economic
sustainability (Künneke, R., & Finger, 2009; Melville et al., 2017).
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2.3 Cost-benefit analysis of deregulating distribution substations
Private investments in substations can either be made by an individual firm or by a
group of firms. Third parties can also make such investments and serves as intermediaries
between the electric utility and firms. For them, it is of great importance to analyze whether
the electricity users would find it worthwhile to pay a substation owner a high enough price
to turn that substation into a profitable business25. In either case, the framework below can
be used to quantify the costs and benefits of investments in substations.
2.3.1 Accumulated savings by reducing per kWh charge
Private ownership of a distribution substation is not a new idea. It has been a common
practice worldwide for large consumers, especially those with high electricity loads
(primarily large commercial and industrial facilities). For instance, in the United States
firms can purchase an existing substation from the utility, install a new one themselves, or
partner with third-party providers (Interstates, 2020). If a substation is purchased from the
utility, a cost estimate is provided by the utility based on factors such as size, age, and
condition. If the utility does not make the substation available, or the firm wants to install
a new one, the firm may directly request quotes. In a partnership, a third party owns the
substation, buys electricity from the utility, and provides it to other firms. This partnership
allows the client firms to avoid capital costs while getting the benefits of metering at a
higher service voltage. Regardless of the option chosen, insurance coverage for service

25

In case of substation privatization, institutional arrangements should be considered in order to
avoid the hold-up problem from technological interdependencies in different production stages.
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reliability is provided by the firm and the utility for their respective facilities as part of
ordinary course of doing business.
The utility often owns and maintains distribution substations. After receiving
electricity from transmission lines in high voltages, distribution substations reduce the
voltage of supply to desired levels for each category of consumers. Depending on how
many voltage-reduction steps the electricity supply passes through, the electric utility
charges a higher rate per kWh after each step to recover the ownership costs of distribution
substations (see Figure 2.2). If a customer decides to purchase power at a higher voltage,
the utility charges a lower per kWh rate. In such cases the customer must install and
maintain its own substation to step down the voltage before final use.
For consumers with high demand for electric service, the present value of the cash
savings on their electricity bills due to the lower per kWh cost of high voltage electricity
is often sufficient to pay off the capital and maintenance costs of a distribution substation
over its lifetime. Table 2.1 shows that the differences in NEA’s retail electricity prices by
voltage and tariff categories. The average savings after switching to high voltage are 2.76
and 2.24 US cents per kWh for low- and medium-voltage connections, respectively. These
savings are equivalent to 28 and 24 percent of the initial tariff rate for low- and mediumvoltage consumers. The savings per kWh and the firm’s average annual kWh of electricity
consumption are the main determinants of the present value of benefits from tariff savings
over a substation’s economic life.
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2.3.2 Value of lost production due to power outages
The unexpected nature of unplanned outages combined with their shorter duration
makes them more detrimental than planned outages to firms’ operations. When a planned
outage occurs, firms can take various precautions to reduce the costs of service
interruptions (Munasinghe & Gellerson, 1979; Sanghvi, 1982). For instance, proper
equipment shutdown prevents damage to equipment and spoilage of production inputs and
outputs. Similarly, labor employment can be curtailed if the production stops in a planned
manner (Hashemi et al., 2018). However, in the case of an unplanned outage, the degree of
losses depends on the flexibility of production inputs (Allcott et al., 2016).
The savings per kWh tariff rates are the lower bound of the substation ownership
benefits in a high distribution-loss environment like Nepal. The possibility of reducing
power failures by installing a captive substation is also a tangible benefit item for firms in
the form of saved production time. The value of forgone production per kWh of unsupplied
electricity is the measure for quantifying this benefit category. Contribution-margin
analysis is a valuable tool for this purpose, given that firm managers typically use it to
compare planned and actual operations (Warren et al., 2013; Galo, 2017). The contribution
margin (i.e., the difference between price and average variable cost) is the portion of sales
revenues covering fixed costs and earning a profit after direct variable costs are deducted.
It is equivalent to a short-run producer surplus. A firm maximizes its profits by maximizing
its contribution and continues to conduct its business in the short run as long as the
contribution is positive, even during circumstances when profits would be negative in the
long run.
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Thus, a firm can use contribution-margin analysis to evaluate the opportunity cost of
unplanned power outages, since the value of forgone production during the outage period
is the contribution margin that would have been realized if the unit had actually been
produced.
The contribution margin for firm i can be estimated as
𝐶𝑀𝑖 = 𝑅𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖𝑚 − 𝑐𝑖𝑒 − 𝑐𝑖𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟

(1)

where R is sales revenue, 𝑐 𝑚 is the cost of raw materials, 𝑐 𝑒 is the cost of electricity, and
𝑐 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 is other direct costs such as maintenance, repairs, and packaging. Due to the
unexpected nature of unplanned outages there are often other cost components borne by
firms. Most firms do not have a flexible labor force that can be released from work for the
outage period to save direct labor costs. In-process material spoilage is another cost
component for some firms.
Once these two costs are taken into account, the total cost of power outages for firm
𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒

i (𝐶𝑖

) can be obtained as shown in Equation 4,
𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒

𝐶𝑖

𝑓

= ∑𝑗=1[𝑑𝑗 + 𝜇(𝑑𝑗 )] . 𝐶𝑀𝑖 + (𝑆𝑉𝑖 − 𝑆𝐶𝑖 )

(2)

where 𝑑𝑗 is the outage duration, 𝜇(𝑑𝑗 ) is the re-start time for an outage duration 𝑑𝑗 , f is the
frequency of outages per annum, 𝑆𝐶𝑖 is the spoilage costs, and 𝑆𝑉𝑖 is the salvage value of
spoiled material-in-process. Using the total cost of power outages and the number of kWhs
not supplied, the levelized cost of power outages can be estimated for each individual firm.
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Estimating Equation 2 for firms in the sample requires access to detailed information
from firms’ operating accounts. Such information is available for a comprehensive set of
firms in Nepal from the 2011 National Census of Manufacturing Establishments (latest
available for Nepal at the time of this study). The national census collects detailed
information about the aggregate value of inputs used and the output produced by different
industries. The contribution value per kWh is estimated for a selected list of sectors and
reported in Table 2.2. Sales revenues are not directly reported in the census data, but the
value of output can be used as an approximation for sale revenues.
Contribution values per kWh range from 0.51 to 2.94USD/kWh. These estimates
clearly show that even without accounting for the cost of idle labor and material spoilage
contribution values per kWh are significant. The estimated contribution values are in the
range of 0.28 to 2.88 USD/kWh reported in Hashemi et al. (2018). They employ three years
of hourly data on power outage occurrences for three Nepalese manufacturing firms.
Estimates of contribution values indicate that even if the savings in tariff differences would
not be sufficient for a firm to justify an investment in a substation, the additional benefits
from reducing the value of lost production might make the investment profitable to the
firm. The extent to which the avoided loss in production time contributes to substation
ownership feasibility depends on the additional power supplied after installing the
dedicated substation.
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2.3.3 The impact of substation ownership on electricity reliability
The following specification is used to estimate the impact of substation ownership on
firm i’s experienced level of electricity reliability,
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛽 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛼𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖

(3)

where 𝑌𝑖 is a measure of electricity reliability for firm i, 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 is the
voltage at which firm i receives electricity from the grid (low, medium, or high), 𝛼𝑟 are
electric utility regional distribution center fixed effects, and 𝜀𝑖 is the error term. The voltage
of connection is a proxy for exposure to externalities in the distribution network.
Three different measures of reliability are tested here. The first measure is whether
the firm reports frequent unplanned outages (experienced outages daily as opposed to a
weekly or monthly basis). The dependent variable equals one if the answer is “Yes” and 0
if “No.” The central assumption here is that frequent unplanned outages reported by a firm
relative to other firms in the same distribution center imply that the substation from which
the firm draws electricity experiences more failures due to overloading, and therefore more
outages.
The second measure of electricity reliability is the frequency of unplanned daily
outages. Power outages could be due to failures at other segments rather than distribution
(e.g., the transmission segment). If a firm reports a higher frequency of unplanned daily
outages than other firms being supplied by the same distribution center, that difference is
most likely attributable to heterogeneities in reliability at the distribution-substation level.
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The third measure of reliability tested is the duration of the most extended unplanned
outage. Technical studies show that if a substation is overloaded more frequently, it not
only becomes more susceptible to failures over time but it also takes longer for that
substation to be brought back online after an outage (ADB, 2020a). It is expected that firms
with captive substations would report shorter-duration outages than those with shared
substations.
2.3.4 Investment appraisal of a captive substation as a mitigation strategy
The net present value (NPV) of investing in a captive substation for firm i can be
expressed as
𝑇
ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ

𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑖 = ∑(1 + 𝑟)−𝑡 [(𝑡𝑖,𝑡

𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒

𝑙𝑜𝑤
− 𝑡𝑖,𝑡
) × 𝐸𝑖,𝑡 × 𝐻𝑖,𝑡 ] + [𝐶𝑖

× 𝐸𝑖,𝑡 × ℎ𝑖,𝑡 ]

(4)

𝑡
ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ

where 𝑟 is the discount rate, 𝑡𝑖,𝑡

𝑙𝑜𝑤
and 𝑡𝑖,𝑡
are the tariff rates per kWh charged by the

electric utility for high- and low-voltage connections, 𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the average kWh of power
𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒

consumption per hour, 𝐻𝑖,𝑡 is annual hours of power consumption, 𝐶𝑖

is the levelized

cost of outages for firm i, and ℎ is averted hours of power outages for firm i due to having
a captive substation26. The analysis covers a period of 10 years (𝑇 = 10), which is the
substation’s economic life. It is also assumed that the benefits of a captive substation will
begin to be realized in the second year of the investment because the construction of the
substation and its transmission lines takes one year to be completed.

26

It is assumed in the base case that the electricity reliability remains the same for the period of
this analysis. Later in this section, an analysis is carried out to identify the breakeven hours of
outages below which the investment is not financially feasible for the firm.
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2.4 Data and methodology
2.4.1 Nepal’s power sector data
Hydropower represents ninety percent of the total installed generation capacity in
Nepal, mostly run-of-the-river type. With river flow being governed by the monsoon and
dry seasons, Nepal experiences significant generation capacity deficits during the dry
season (winter months) when electricity demand is at its peak. In response to low dryseason hydropower generation, the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA), the central
government-owned generator, grid operator and distributor, has used a load curtailment
program (known as load shedding).
Insufficient upstream capacity has not been the only challenge in Nepal’s electricity
sector. NEA’s annual reports show that even during the monsoon season with its abundance
of hydropower availability, a significant amount of generated and transmitted electricity is
lost in the distribution network. Despite NEA’s efforts to decrease the distribution losses,
an average loss of 17 percent is reported across regional distribution centers in 2016 (NEA,
2016). Technically speaking, a fraction of generated electricity inevitably gets lost in the
transmission and distribution systems (known as technical losses). The magnitude of these
losses can be minimized by proper design and timely maintenance of distribution
substations. For instance, in the United States, it is estimated that only 5 percent of
generated electricity was lost in transmission and distribution networks in 2014 through
2018 (IEA, 2019). Three times more losses in Nepal’s distribution network than the
combined losses in transmission and distribution losses in the United States imply that
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there factors other than technical factors (non-technical factors) contribute to these
substantial losses.
A closer look at Nepal’s regional distribution centers reveals a noticeable
heterogeneity in their losses. Eight regional centers across Nepal distribute electricity. Each
of these centers is responsible for distributing the electricity transmitted by the national
grid to a particular group of districts across the country (a total of 77 districts). The total
megawatt-hours (MWh) received by each of the eight distribution centers (net of
transmission loss) and the total MWhs billed by each center to its customers are extracted
from NEA reports. For each center, the ratio of the difference between the two totals over
total MWhs of transmitted electricity represents the percentage loss in the distribution
network, as shown in Equation 5,
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 =

𝑀𝑊ℎ𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑑−𝑀𝑊ℎ𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘
𝑀𝑊ℎ𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘

.

(5)

As depicted in Figure 2.2, percentage losses across distribution centers ranged from as
low as 10.24 percent to as high as 36.45 percent in 2016, when the firm-level data used in
this study was collected. This variation suggests that the sample firms drew electricity from
distribution networks with different electricity reliability levels.
2.4.2 Firm-level data
The firm-level data is obtained from a sample of 590 Nepalese firms surveyed in
201627. The survey collected information about the voltage at which each firm purchased

27

The survey is conducted by the Millennium Challenge Corporation in partnership with the government of
Nepal. For more information visit https://data.mcc.gov/evaluations/i ndex.php/catalog/194/studydescription.
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electricity from the national electric utility. This rich information facilitates the
identification of each firm’s substation ownership. If a firm draws electricity from the grid
at a primary voltage (i.e., high voltage), it means that the firm has to have a captive
substation to step down the voltage before final use. Otherwise, drawing electricity at a
secondary voltage (i.e., medium or low voltages), indicating that the firm is connected to a
shared utility-owned substation. Although such information may be readily provided by a
typical electric utility in a developed country, most electric utilities in developing countries,
where unreliable access to electricity is prevalent, do not have detailed information beyond
the transmission lines (Wijayatunga, & Siyambalapitiya, 2016).
While each firm in the sample is connected to the same national grid, the voltage at
which they receive electricity varies depending on their power needs. For instance, small
service-sector firms might use electricity primarily for lighting purposes and powering
appliances with low power requirements. Large industrial firms might use electricity as an
input of production (such as cooling and heating raw materials or powering heavy
equipment and machinery). Low voltage connections provide sufficient electricity for
lighting purposes and running small electric appliances, but higher voltage connections are
required for industrial purposes. Out of 590 firms in the sample, 435 firms have lowvoltage connections, 105 firms have medium-voltage connections, and 50 firms have highvoltage connections.
2.5 Results
Table 2.3 presents the sample’s descriptive statistics. There are 50 firms in the sample
with captive substations (high voltage connections). While 36 percent of firms with low
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and medium voltage connections report unplanned outages daily, only 4 percent of firms
with high-voltage connections have experienced unplanned daily outages. Also, firms with
captive substations report fewer unplanned outages in a day, and they report a shorter
duration for those outages. Table 2.3 shows a list of firms’ characteristics by voltage of
connection. There are firms with different sizes across all voltage categories. Industrial
firms mostly use medium and high voltage connections.
Table 2.4 reports the regression results from estimating Equation 3. Firms with captive
substations are 30 percent less likely to experience unplanned outages on a daily basis than
firms with utility-owned shared substations (see column 1). The reason for this disparity is
that firms with captive substations tend to be less exposed to the cumulative effect of
distribution-line and substation overloads than firms with shared substations. Compared to
captive substations, which provide a dedicated supply to the owner, the distribution lines
coming out of a utility-owned substation spread across a vast difficult-to-monitor
geographical area. Therefore, firms located further downstream tend to experience more
interruptions. More precisely, firms with captive substations report 0.8 fewer outages per
day on average than other firms (see column 2).
Unplanned outages also last for a shorter period for high- and medium-voltage firms
than for low-voltage firms (see column 3). This finding is consistent with the study by
LaCommare and Eto (2006), who find that larger commercial and industrial customers
often experience shorter power interruptions than smaller commercial and residential
customers. The results indicate that both medium- and high-voltage firms report durations
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of unplanned outages that are 0.99 and 1.49 hours shorter than those reported by low
voltage-firms.
It can be inferred from the empirical results that in the case of a utility-owned
substation, service reliability diminishes for all because electricity users fail to internalize
the overloading costs that they impose on others. When distribution substations are
privately owned, the costs of overloads are borne directly by a profit-maximizing business
owner with the proper incentives to protect the substation against overloads. The
operational performance of low-voltage networks can be improved by adding new
substations to reduce the number of consumers covered by each substation. The investment
appraisal of captive substations as a method of mitigating losses from unplanned outages
described in Section 2.3.4 is carried out in this section.
The CBA is conducted for a representative firm with an average of 1 MWh electricity
consumption per hour. Given its power consumption, this firm requires a substation with a
capacity of 2 megavolt amperes (MVA). The investment cost of constructing a 2 MVA
substation in Nepal is estimated to be around 0.75 USD million, with annual operating and
maintenance costs of 0.016 USD million, at 2016 prices28.

28

The technical requirements and cost estimates listed in this section are provided with consultation
of business owners in Nepal who have invested in captive substations. The initial investment cost
includes the cost of acquiring land, construction of a building to house switchgears and panels, cost
of equipment, transmission line from the substation to the site’s power station, and delivery costs.
Also, to maintain the quality of service from the substation, there are annual operation and
maintenance costs (O&M). The O&M cost is mainly the labor cost and the materials required for
substation’s efficient operation.
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The CBA starts with the saving in tariff rates as the only benefit considered. Using a
tariff difference of 2.76 US cents per kWh (the average value of rate difference presented
in Table 2.1), the investment has a negative NPV unless the firm operates for 16 hours
every day, plans for load growth in the near future, or shares the substation with another
firm. This highlights the critical role of a substation’s utilization rate in the investment’s
net value. The utilization rate needs to be sufficiently high to make the investment
financially feasible, but not so high as to cause overloading.
Following the discussion in Section 2.3, apart from the savings in electricity expenses
a captive substation also provides substantial benefits by reducing losses during power
outages. The next step in the analysis is to calculate the opportunity cost of the electricity
not supplied due to power outages, using the levelized cost of the electricity lost. The
levelized cost can be estimated by taking the present value of the losses in contribution
value that would have borne by the firm over the captive substation’s life and dividing this
value by the present value of the quantity of the electricity supply that would have been
lost during this period. The levelized cost is the rate per kWh that would make the NPV of
the electricity not supplied equal to the costs inflicted by the power outages. Assuming a
levelized cost of 0.50 US cents per kWh and 16 hours of daily operation, the NPV of
substation investment by a representative firm amounts to 0.97 USD million at 2016
prices29.

29

To calculate the benefits from the value of lost production saved, one of the main inputs is the
additional power supplied by the captive substation (ℎ𝑖,𝑡 in Eq. 5). Here, it is assumed that the
captive substation mitigates one hour of unplanned outage per day, a cumulative duration of 365
hours per year. Hence, having a captive substation translates into 365 MWh of additional power
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A significant risk factor associated with captive substation investments is uncertainty
about the future status of the electricity reliability provided by the electric utility. The more
reliable the electric utility’s service provision becomes, the lower the inflow of benefits
from savings in losses due to outages will be. Breakeven analysis is conducted to estimate
what fraction of the current frequency of outages (365 hours per year) would make the
NPV equal to zero. It appears that even if only 42 percent of power outages (153 hours per
year) take place, the investment would still be financially viable.
Because the sample is nationally representative, the economic gains to the whole
economy can also be estimated. About 10 percent of the firms in the sample have captive
substations, of these firms, 88 percent are industrial or manufacturing. As reported in the
National Economic Census (NEC), the total population of manufacturing establishments
in Nepal is 104,058. Therefore, a total of 93,652 firms can potentially get connected to
newly-built private substations with reforms facilitating private ownership of substations.
Assuming that each private substation would probably be relevant for clusters of five firms
(to create enough demand to justify a substation), the maximum number of private-sector
substations would be 18,730. With 0.97 USD million net economic gains from a
representative substation, the total economic gains to Nepal would amount to 18.17 USD
billion at 2016 prices.

supplied. This assumption is reasonable given that the low-voltage firms with shard substations
report an average of 1 unplanned outage per day and a median duration of 2 hours for an extended
unplanned outage. Moreover, Hashemi et al. (2018) evaluate the cost of outages using hourly data
for three manufacturing firms in Nepal. The three-year average of cumulative duration of
unplanned outages experienced by the firms per year range from 282 to 409 hours.
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The CBA presented above assumes that investors can undertake to build substations,
buy high-voltage electricity from the public electric utility, and then sell reliable lowvoltage electricity to customers. However, building a captive substation in Nepal is a
challenging proposition in the current institutional and governance framework. First, it
requires special permissions from the public electric utility, which are subject to
bureaucratic procedures. The next challenge is to acquire the land needed for housing the
substation. Since a substation must be located close to high-voltage transmission towers,
the choice of location is limited. Although regulations allow the land adjacent to roads to
be used for this purpose, a transmission line from the substation to the point of consumption
must pass through the land belonging to third parties, creating contractual challenges.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has investigated the quantitative significance of common-pool resource
problems in electric network infrastructures. The transmission of electricity by local
distribution networks requires load and capacity management that increases in complexity
with the number of users. Moreover, a local electric network is limited in physical capacity,
and its overuse leads to reduced reliability of electricity service. Using firm- and
substation-level data from a sample of Nepalese firms, the results provide an empirical
evidence of CPR problems across ownership boundaries and network configurations. The
findings show that those with captive substations are less likely to report frequent
unplanned outages than those with shared substations. Moreover, unplanned outages
reported by captive-substation firms last for shorter periods. These findings are consistent
with the results of Pless and Fell (2017) that consumer-level behavior on the demand side
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of the electricity market creates negative impacts on the overall quality of the service due
to common-pool resource characteristics of electricity.
The findings of this chapter indicate that the CPR problem could be largely solved if
private firms were allowed to own and operate substations. Currently, private ownership
of substations is prohibited in Nepal unless they are unique to a single firm that owns and
uses all the electricity from a substation. The cost-benefit analysis presented in this paper
demonstrates that the annual gain to a representative firm from eliminating this restriction
would be on the order of 0.32 USD million.
One concern about privatizing a part of the distribution segment would be the
possibility of local monopoly pricing by parties owning the substations. This requires a
contracting system to mitigate local monopoly pricing of electricity. Moreover, the need to
consider the hold-up risk is critical during the transition period to competition (Valletti &
Estache, 2001). Allowing both public and private substations to exist side-by-side can be a
solution to facilitate the transition to competitive pricing.
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Table 2.1: Retail electricity tariffs in Nepal (2016 prices)

Tariff
category

Electricity charge by voltage (US cents per
kWh)

Rate difference (US cents per kWh)
Reference for high voltage: 7.14 US cents per
kWh

Low

Medium

Between low
& high

Between medium
& high

Industrial

9.14

8.19

2.00

1.05

Commercial

10.67

10.57

3.53

3.43

Average

9.90

9.38

2.76

2.24
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Table 2.2: Contribution value per kWh by industry (2016 prices)
Sector
Variable
Grain mill
products

Sawmilling &
planning of
wood

Plastic
products

Structural
metal products

Cutting,
shaping &
finishing of
stone

Manufacture of
articles of
concrete &
cement

334

24

152

288

27

10.85

276.05

16.45

107.84

215.59

8.85

5.94

Electricity

3.60

0.25

3.95

4.98

0.95

0.09

Other (fuel, water, repair
and maintenance, etc.)

3.35

0.65

4.22

8.81

5.25

0.92

283.00

17.35

116.01

229.38

14.19

6.95

51

6.65

35.99

58.62

12.81

3.90

74,418

5,293

46,914

105,811

12,863

1,326

0.69

1.26

0.77

0.55

1.00

2.94

Value of output (USD
mil.)
Value of output
Direct costs of
production (USD mil.)
Raw material

Total direct costs

Total contribution value
(USD mil.)
MWh of electricity
purchased
Contribution value
(USD per kWh)

Source: author’s calculations based on the data from the 2011 National Census of Manufacturing
Establishment
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Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics
Voltage of Connection
Variable

Low
n = 435

Medium
n = 105

High
n = 50

1,565

4,296

7,267

(5,437)

(5,173)

(9,660)

Whether experienced unplanned outages on a daily
basis (No = 0 , Yes =1)

0.36

0.36

0.04

Number of unplanned outages in a day

1.07

0.93

0.09

(1.69)

(1.38)

(0.43)

3.44

2.31

1.24

(3.10)

(1.54)

(0.72)

50.89

129.00

125.28

(128.00)

(302.15)

(223.18)

Small

0.53

0.32

0.16

Medium

0.37

0.36

0.42

Large

0.10

0.32

0.42

Industry/manufacturing

0.49

0.80

0.88

Services

0.51

0.20

0.12

Current monthly utility electricity bill (USD)

Electricity reliability measures

Duration of most extended unplanned outage
experienced (hours)

Firm characteristics
Number of full-time employees
Firm size

Sector of activity
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Table 2.4: Substation configuration and electricity reliability
OLS

OLS

OLS

Dep. Var.: Whether
experienced
unplanned outages
daily
(No = 0 , Yes =1)

Dep. Var.:
Frequency of
unplanned outages in
a day

Dep. Var.: Duration
of most extended
unplanned outage
experienced (hours)

- 0.02

- 0.06

- 0.99***

(0.06)

(0.19)

(0.38)

- 0.30****

- 0.78***

- 1.49***

(0.08)

(0.27)

(0.52)

Regional distribution
center FE

YES

YES

YES

No. of observations

451

451

409

Variable

Voltage of connection
Medium

High

Notes: * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01. Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
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Houses
Light Industry

Small offices

Heavy Industry

Light Industry

9.38 ¢/kWh

EHV / HV

STDS: Sub-transmission Distribution Substation
PDS: Primary Distribution Substation
SDS: Secondary Distribution Substation
EHV: Extra-high voltage
HV: High voltage
MV: Medium voltage
LV: Low voltage

SDS

Transmission

10.73 ¢/kWh

PDS

STDS

7.14 ¢/kWh

Generation

Shops

HV / MV

MV / LV

Distribution network

Figure 2.1: General Layout of Electricity Distribution Network

Note: The figure depicts a schematic of the electric network in Nepal. Distances in the layout are
not to scale, and they have been shrunk or exaggerated to elaborate the concept. At the distribution
level, three voltages are offered to consumers: high, medium, and low. Each step of voltage
reduction adds to the cost of supply. Therefore, the energy charge per kWh of electricity delivered
to a high voltage consumer is less than medium voltage, and medium voltage is less than low
voltage.
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Figure 2.2: Percentage loss in distribution networks across Nepal by regional distribution
centers
Source: author’s calculations based on NEA’s reports.
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CHAPTER 3
THE EFFECT OF IMPROVEMENTS IN GRID-ELECTRICITY ACCESS ON
HOUSEHOLD ELECTRICITY CONSUMPTION ACROSS INCOME STRATA: A
MULTI-DIMENSIONAL APPROACH

3.1 Introduction
As low-income countries strive to meet United Nations Sustainable Development
Goal 7 (SDG 7, universal access to electricity), residential electricity consumption remains
low despite substantial investments in grid expansion programs (Blimpo & CosgroveDavies, 2019; Blimpo et al., 2020)30. Supply-side constraints have been blamed for low
electricity consumption (Bhatia & Angelou, 2015; Aidoo & Briggs, 2019; Pelz &
Urpelainen, 2020), since insufficient upstream capacity in the generation and transmission
segments and overloaded downstream infrastructure in the distribution segment cause
varying availability and reliability levels for consumers connected to the same national
grid31.

“Universal access to modern energy by 2030” is one of the three key pillars of the Sustainable
Energy for All (SE4All) program, an initiative co-chaired by the United Nations (UN) Secretary
General and the World Bank President.
30

31

Availability of grid-electricity takes into account the timing and duration of supply and reliability
considers the frequency of interruptions to supply. Although availability and reliability may be seen
as the same issue, addressing them requires different interventions.
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This study investigates the impact of improvements in grid-electricity access on the
electricity consumption of households at different income levels32. Using a nationally
representative sample of Nepalese residential consumers consisting of 4,660 households, I
investigate the extent to which improved reliability of the electricity grid is likely to affect
electricity consumption of both the poor and the non-poor.
I segment households into similar groups based on the supply constraints they face
using an unsupervised machine learning technique. To categorize the different levels of
reliability available to households, I group households along three dimensions: available
hours of electricity per day (maximum of 24 hours), available hours of electricity during
the evening peak-time (6-10 PM, a maximum of 4 hours), and frequency of outages
experienced by households in a typical week. I estimate the optimal number of clusters via
the K-means clustering technique33. The largest cluster comprises 55% of the sample, with
the rest of the households are distributed across four clusters, representing 5%, 11%, 10%,
and 19% of the sample. The clusters reveal three distinct patterns of grid-electricity
constraints: (1) low availability with frequent outages (clusters 1 and 2); (2) high
availability with frequent outages (clusters 3 and 4); and (3) high availability without
frequent outages (cluster 5).

32

Improved access to the grid-electricity supply can be defined in terms of enhanced attributes of
electricity that make it more usable for the desired applications. In this paper, I focus on the impact
of enhancing the availability and reliability attributes on electricity consumption.
33

The objective of the K-means clustering technique is to achieve the highest intra-cluster similarity
and lowest inter-cluster similarity. Observations are grouped into k homogenous clusters. The first
step of the analysis is to determine the optimal number of clusters. Following the previous literature,
I use the elbow method (Ramachandran et al., 2018), which determines the number of clusters by
examining the within-cluster variance as a function of the number of clusters.
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After identifying household clusters, I investigate the extent to which unreliable
access constrains households’ electricity demand at different income levels by focusing on
the impact of system reliability on electric appliance ownership. The residential demand
for electricity is derived from the household’s demand for electric appliance services.
Unreliable electricity affects a household’s choice of appliances because it reduces the
benefit for the household from ownership of such appliances. Therefore, if reliability
improvements impact households’ purchase decisions and the portfolio of appliances
owned, they will also impact electricity consumption (McRae, 2010; Meeks et al., 2020).
This approach avoids the potential endogeneity bias due to unobserved factors determining
both the appliance choice and electricity consumption when electric appliance ownership
is an independent variable in electricity demand estimation (McRae, 2010).
I find that improved access to grid electricity is positively correlated with the
probability of electric appliance ownership. The interaction of income and supplyconstraint indicators in a piecewise regression model suggests that the insufficient capacity
of power supply constrains households equally at all income levels. In contrast, the
frequency of unplanned service interruptions does not appear to matter at any income level.
These findings imply that if electricity from the grid were available 24-hour a day, the
average duration of the remaining outages would probably be so short that it would not
affect electric appliance ownership decisions.
In addition, I find that the effect of income on appliance ownership is approximately
the same across all income quintiles. The importance of this finding is highlighted when I
investigate how households’ coping behavior changes when they experience different
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levels of reliability. The results from an ordered probit model with three backup decision
alternatives indicate no association between backup decisions and income in the first two
income quintiles. On the other hand, higher-income quintiles are associated with significant
changes in coping behavior when electricity is available from the grid all day long, and
unplanned outages are not frequent. Thus, the increased availability of supply hours from
the grid matters more for poor households, for whom the combined cost of both appliances
and backup equipment may be prohibitive34.
With more progress being made toward achieving SDG7, the findings in this study
highlight how unreliable access to electricity constrains the acquisition of household
electric appliances. Thus, reliability improvements are expected to increase benefits from
electric appliance usage through greater household appliance ownership and, consequently,
increased electricity consumption.
Recent studies have highlighted the importance of employing a multi-dimensional
measurement framework rather than simply counting grid connections when measuring
energy access and the associated economic impacts (Bhatia & Angelou, 2015; Mendoza et
al., 2019; Pelz & Urpelainen 2020). A focus on counting connections - politically
motivated in most cases - without considering household electrical energy service
utilization has deteriorated electric utilities’ cash flows in low-income countries (Blimpo
& Cosgrove-Davies, 2019). The findings presented in this paper show that a multi-

34

Poorer households either do not invest in coping equipment or use low-quality coping equipment
(such as kerosene and candles) that provide low-quality lighting services.
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dimensional measure framework is extremely useful in studying the impact of
improvements in grid-electricity constraints on electricity consumption.
3.2 Methodology and data
3.2.1 Methodology
The availability and reliability of grid-electricity supply is a multi-dimensional
issue that should be measured using a variety of indicators representing multiple attributes.
For instance, outages may be frequent but last for only a few minutes or for several hours.
In addition, the time of day when grid electricity is available is an essential factor because
the demand for lighting services - the main category of electricity consumption in lowincome countries - is highest during the evening hours. Therefore, if grid power is available
for extended hours during the day but constrained during the evening, households will still
be significantly constrained in their electricity use.
Various supply-side and demand-side factors can cause power outages. Supply-side
causes include insufficient upstream capacity in the generation and transmission segments
and overloaded downstream infrastructure in the distribution segment. Outages can also
occur when the peak demand for electricity exceeds the total amount that the system can
supply. Thus, the availability and reliability of electricity supply from the same national
grid may vary from one locality to another.
In this paper, differences in system reliability are explored using K-means
clustering, an unsupervised data-mining technique with applications in various fields such
as market segmentation analysis and social network studies. In the energy economics
literature, K-means clustering has been used to analyze smart-meter data to understand
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residential electricity load profiles and consumption patterns (Trotta, 2020). Estimates of
these patterns have been used in load forecasting, tariff design, and demand-response
programs (Rhodes et al., 2014; Trotta, 2020). Identifying consumer segments with similar
electricity load profiles allows for a broader range of policy analyses in electricity markets,
including studies of the advisability of grid expansion and the efficient level of service
reliability (Hayn et al., 2014).
After identifying the relevant household clusters in terms of service reliability, I
exploit the variation in reliability across household clusters to estimate the effect of
improvements on high-load electric appliance ownership. The residential demand for
electricity is derived from the households’ demand for electric appliances. Unreliable
electricity affects a household’s choice of appliances because it reduces the benefit for the
household from ownership of such appliances. Therefore, if reliability improvements
impact households’ purchase decisions and the portfolio of appliances owned, they will
also shift the demand curve for residential electricity. The alternative of estimating the
electricity demand, using either electricity bills or hours of consumption as the dependent
variables, is likely to yield inconsistent estimates because of the clear endogeneity of
appliance ownership as a regressor.
3.2.2 Data Description
I use a nationally representative survey of Nepalese households, collected as part
of the World Bank’s Multi-Tier Framework (MTF) for Assessing Energy Access Program
(World Bank, 2019). The survey was conducted in 2017, one year after the total elimination
of load shedding in Nepal through electric power imports from India. The sample design
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was based on a two-stage stratification to ensure the national representativeness of the
sample. In the first stage, the enumeration areas were selected randomly within
stratifications, representing urban and rural areas and Nepal’s three distinct ecological
regions (mountains, hills, and terai). In the second stage, households were randomly
selected for interviews from wards chosen in the first stage. The raw dataset consists of
6,000 households, of which 4,660 were grid-connected. I focus only on those gridconnected households in this study. Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for the 3,847
grid-connected households for which there are no missing data.
The household segmentation variables listed in Table 3.1 represent three
dimensions of system reliability. Households report in the survey that electricity from the
grid is available on average for almost 22 hours per day, with a minimum of 7 and
maximum of 24 hours of availability. Moreover, the frequency of outages per week varies
greatly across households, with a mean of 7 and a standard deviation of 9.37. The third
dimension of reliability is peak-time availability, measured as the hours of grid electricity
availability from 6 PM to 10 PM. The sample average is 3.56 hours with a standard
deviation of 0.68 hours. The three panels in Figure 3.1 illustrate the district-level average
hours of grid electricity availability, frequency of outages, and peak-time availability.
Households reported a wide variety of electric appliance ownership, ranging from
light bulbs and mobile phone chargers, which require only a few watts, to space heaters
and air conditioners, which require several kilowatts. Based on the amount of electricity
needed to operate, their electric appliances can be categorized as low-power or high-power
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(see Table 3.2)35. The more high-load appliances a household owns, the higher is its
demand for grid electricity for a given level of income. In addition, wealthier households
tend to have more high-load appliances because of their higher incomes. The distribution
of the total number of high-load appliance ownership represents skewness in consumption,
with a mean and median of 1.46 and 1, respectively.
In electricity markets with frequent power outages, household coping behavior is a
strong predictor of current and future electricity demand (Hashemi, 2021)36. The
households in the sample reported ownership of a wide range of coping equipment for
lighting purposes during blackouts, including disposable batteries (used with flashlights),
kerosene lamps, solar lanterns, and solar lighting. Some households also use high-quality
coping equipment such as rechargeable batteries, voltage stabilizers, and generators to
power their appliances during service outages. The survey asked two questions about each
household’s coping behavior: whether it uses any backups for (1) lighting only and (2)
lighting plus appliances. Based on the responses to these two questions, I define three
binary variables for a household’s backup status: no backup, backup for lighting only, and
backup for both lighting and appliances. While 9 percent of households do not engage in

According to the World Bank’s MTF framework, appliances with load levels less than 200 watts
are low-power appliances, and those with load levels greater than 200 watts are high-power
appliances.
35

36

Coping behavior refers to decisions made by electricity consumers about how to deal with power
outages. During blackouts, consumers may use their off-grid coping equipment (such as
rechargeable batteries and generators) or delay all electricity-intensive activities until power
returns.
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any coping behavior, 60 percent of them back up for lighting only and 31 percent back up
for both lighting and appliances.
The survey also collected information about households’ characteristics. I use those
characteristics documented in the literature as predictors of electricity demand (Lee et al.,
2016; Blimpo & Cosgrove-Davies, 2019; Tesfamichael et al., 2020): income, time spent at
home, educational attainment, and urban/rural locality. I use the recurring combined
monthly expenses reported by households on food, rent, and other services as a proxy for
income37. I divide households into quintiles of total monthly expenditures. Thirty three
percent of the households in the sample live in rural areas, with the other 67 percent spread
across urban areas. Thirteen percent of household heads in the sample report as retired and
12 percent report as housewives/househusbands. This is relevant because if the household
head is a housewife/husband or retiree, electricity demand is likely to be affected because
that person spends more time at home.
3.3 Results
I use the elbow method developed by Makles (2012) to find the optimal number of
clusters. Figure 3.2 illustrates the within-cluster variance plotted against the number of
clusters. The criterion for choosing the optimal number of clusters is to find a point where
the marginal decline in within-cluster variance falls to the “elbow” point. For these data,

37

Other goods and services include medical and pharmacy expenses; cleaning supplies, cosmetics,
toiletries, water expenses; mobile phone top-up; internet, land phone, cable, and other household
communication; and transportation costs.
81

the number of clusters beyond which marginal reductions in within-cluster variance are not
significant is five.
Table 3.3 lists the unscaled mean and standard deviation of segmentation variables
across the five clusters and the number of observations in each cluster. Cluster 5 is the
largest group comprising 55% of the sample. The rest of the sample households are
distributed across clusters 1 to 4, representing 5%, 11%, 10%, and 19% of the sample. As
shown in Figure 3.3, overall and peak-time availability hours are significantly less than the
sample average for the first group (clusters 1 and 2). While the frequency of outages is
above the sample average for the second group (clusters 3 and 4), grid electricity is
available for longer hours for the households in this group. Cluster 5 exhibits the lowest
variability in the duration of grid-electricity availability (standard deviation of 0.77 hours).
Households in this cluster also report an uninterrupted service during the evening peak
hours. Based on the segmentation variables, the clusters reveal three distinct system
reliability levels: (1) low availability with frequent outages (clusters 1 and 2); (2) high
availability with frequent outages (clusters 3 and 4); and (3) high availability without
frequent outages (cluster 5).
Table 3.4 reports the estimated coefficients for a linear probability model with an
indicator for high-load appliance ownership as the dependent variable without applying the
K-means clustering method. These estimates imply, counterintuitively, a negative relation
between peak-time availability and appliance ownership. Additionally, the frequency of
outages is estimated to have only a very small effect on the likelihood of high-load
appliance ownership. It seems likely that the K-means clustering method offers a better
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way to characterize grid reliability, essentially because of the way it deals with
multicollinearity among system reliability measures. The K-means clustering method
achieves that by grouping households into unique clusters of supply constraints instead of
using each measure of supply constraint as a separate regressor.
Table 3.5 shows the results of a linear piecewise regression model with indicators
for reliability clusters and defined breakpoints at income quintiles to allow the marginal
effect of income to vary by quintile. I find that extended hours of availability matter equally
for all income levels, whereas the frequency of unplanned service interruptions does not
matter at any income level. As shown in column 1, although improvements in each supply
constraint are associated with a higher probability of high-load electric appliance
ownership, the magnitude of these impacts is the same in all income quintiles. In particular,
when availability hours are extended, those with and without frequent outages are equally
more likely (17 percent) to own high-load appliances. Thus, it appears that once availability
is increased, the frequency of unplanned outages does not affect households’ appliance
ownership decisions.
Moreover, there are no differences in the marginal effects of income across clusters
when they are interacted with cluster indicators (column 2). With the most severe
constraints as the reference group (low availability with frequent outages), the results
indicate that none of the income groups is more constrained than others by service
availability. I also estimate separately the impact of each availability measure (daily and
peak-time) on appliance ownership. As shown in Tables 3.6 and 3.7, I find no statistically
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significant difference in the impact of reliability on appliance ownership across income
levels.
In all specifications the marginal effect of income on appliance ownership is
statistically significant at the first income quintile, holding constant the reliability level.
The importance of this finding is highlighted more when I investigate how a household's
coping behavior changes with access improvements. The estunates for an ordered probit
model with the three alternative backup decisions as the ranked categories (Table 3.8)
suggest that when the availability and reliability of service are relatively improved,
consumers change their coping behavior. In particular, with a reasonably reliable service,
when power outages occur households reschedule their use of electric appliances and use
backup for lighting only. However, for poorer households, the marginal effect of income
is not significant. In other words, income constraints limit both appliance ownership and
coping decisions. Thus, it is expected that the impact of increased availability of supply
hours from the grid may be more substantial for poorer households.
3.4 Conclusion
This paper estimates the extent to which electricity consumers of different income
levels would increase their use of high-load appliances in response to improvements in grid
reliability. The results indicate that although grid-connected households are counted in the
electrification statistics, unreliable electricity service significantly constrains their electric
appliance ownership and, consequently, electricity consumption. Putting this paper’s
findings into SDG 7’s perspective, a connection to the grid by itself does not necessarily
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translate to realized benefits from electricity consumption. The availability and reliability
of the service play a critical role for households at all income levels.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Variable
Segmentation variables
Daily availability of grid electricity
Frequency of outages
Availability during the evening peak time (6 – 10 PM)
Household characteristics
Electricity bill in a typical month (USD)
Total number of high-load appliances
Quintiles of total monthly expenditures
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
Backup status
No backup
Only for lighting
Both for lighting and appliances
Education status of the household head
No formal education
Primary
Secondary
College education
Household head gender
Female
Time spent at home
Retired / too old to work
Housewife/husband
Locality
Urban

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Max

21.93
6.97
3.56

2.89
9.37
0.68

7
0
0

24
88
4

4.94
1.43

7.43
1.94

0.04
0

77.31
10

73.44
122.09
166.90
228.20
492.05

19.66
12.46
13.81
23.27
415.52

14.28
100.76
144.28
192.66
274.17

100.66
144.19
192.57
274.00
3,666.48

0.09
0.61
0.30
0.35
0.22
0.38
0.05
0.20
0.12
0.11
0.66

Number of observations

3,847
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Table 3.2: Appliances owned by households in the sample
Appliance type by the power load
Low-load

High-load

Incandescent Light Bulb

Refrigerator

Fluorescent Tube

Hairdryer

Compact Fluorescent Light (CFL) Bulb Electric food processor/blende
LED Light Bulb

Electric rice cooker

Radio/CD Players/sound system

Microwave oven

VCD/DVD

Electric Iron

Fan

Washing machine

Computer/ Laptop

Electric sewing machine

Smartphone (internet phone) charger

Air cooler

Regular mobile phone charger

Air conditioner

Black & White TV

Space Heater

Regular Color TV

Electric water heater

Flat color TV

Electric hot water pot/kettle
Electric Water Pump

Source: Nepal’s Multi-Tier Framework Survey (World Bank, 2019)
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Table 3.3: Variation in segmentation variables across clusters
Cluster
Segmentation variable
1

2

3

4

5

13.70

18.48

21.40

21.63

23.55

(3.26)

(2.36)

(1.98)

(1.25)

(0.77)

37.09

9.73

12.81

8.44

2.14

(10.83)

(6.11)

(7.49)

(5.90)

(2.20)

2.86

2.26

3.99

2.99

4.00

(0.81)

(0.57)

(0.05)

(0.09)

(0.00)

Number of observations

193

417

392

716

2,129

Percentage of the sample

5%

11%

10%

19%

55%

Daily availability hours (max.
of 24 hours)

Frequency of outages

Availability during the peak
time (max. of 4 hours)

Figures in parentheses are standard deviations.

88

Table 3.4: Estimates of system reliability impacts without K-means clustering
OLS
Dep. var.: high-load electric
appliance ownership

Variable

Grid-electricity supply constraints
Daily availability hours

0.0264***
(0.0035)

Frequency of outages

- 0.0034***
(0.0010)

Availability during the peak time

- 0.0419***
(0.0127)

Controls

YES

Number of observations

3,847

Notes: * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. Controls
include indicators household’s income, housewife/husband, too old to work or retired, female, educational
attainment, and rural-urban status.
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Table 3.5: System reliability and appliance ownership
Dep. Var.: High-load electric
appliance ownership
(1)
(2)

Variables
Clusters of grid-electricity supply constraint
High availability with frequent outages

0.1678***
(0.0222)

0.1963
(0.1447)

0.1728***
(0.0205)

0.1936
(0.1682)

0.0031***
(0.0006)

0.0040***
(0.001)

Quintile 2 expenditures

- 0.0010
(0.0012)

- 0.0025
(0.003)

Quintile 3 expenditures

0.0003
(0.0013)

0.0018
(0.003)

Quintile 4 expenditures

- 0.0013
(0.0009)

- 0.0047**
(0.0023)

Quintile 5 expenditures

- 0.0001***
(0.0003)

0.0013
(0.0009)

High availability without frequent outages
Total monthly expenditures (USD)
Quintile 1 expenditures

Interaction between high availability with frequent outages and expenditures
Quintile 1 expenditures × High availability with frequent outages

- 0.0004
(0.0018)

Quintile 2 expenditures × High availability with frequent outages

0.0004
(0.0038)

Quintile 3 expenditures × High availability with frequent outages

- 0.0027
(0.0041)

Quintile 4 expenditures × High availability with frequent outages

0.0056*
(0.0029)

Quintile 5 expenditures × High availability with frequent outages

- 0.0030**
(0.0012)

Interaction between high availability without frequent outages and expenditures
Quintile 1 expenditures × High availability without frequent outages

- 0.0011
(0.0016)

Quintile 2 expenditures × High availability without frequent outages

0.0020
(0.0035)

Quintile 3 expenditures × High availability without frequent outages

- 0.0071
(0.0037)

Quintile 4 expenditures × High availability without frequent outages

0.0028
(0.0026)

Quintile 5 expenditures × High availability without frequent outages

- 0.0030***
(0.0010)
YES
3,847

Controls
Observations

YES
3,847

Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. Controls include indicators for
housewife/husband, too old to work or retired, female, educational attainment, and rural-urban status.
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Table 3.6: Daily availability and appliance ownership
Dep. Var.: High-load electric appliance
ownership
(1)
(2)

Variables
Grid-electricity supply constraint (ref. group: < 24-hour
availability)
24-hour availability

0.0594***
(0.0148)

- 0.0157
(0.1143)

0.0032***
(0.0006)

0.0029***
(0.0008)

Quintile 2 expenditures

- 0.0013
0.0012

- 0.0006
(0.0015)

Quintile 3 expenditures

0.0006
(0.0013)

- 0.0001
(0.0017)

Quintile 4 expenditures

- 0.0012
(0.0009)

- 0.0016
(0.0012)

Quintile 5 expenditures

- 0.0012***
(0.0003)

- 0.0006
(0.0004)

Total monthly expenditures (USD)
Quintile 1 expenditures

Interaction between availability and expenditures
Quintile 1 expenditures × 24-hour availability

0.0006
(0.00127)

Quintile 2 expenditures × 24-hour availability

- 0.0018
(0.0025)

Quintile 3 expenditures × 24-hour availability

0.0020
(0.0027)

Quintile 4 expenditures × 24-hour availability

0.0005
(0.0018)

Quintile 5 expenditures × 24-hour availability

- 0.0015**
(0.0007)

Controls
Observations

YES
3,847

YES
3,847

Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. Controls include indicators for
housewife/husband, too old to work or retired, female, educational attainment, and rural-urban status.
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Table 3.7: Peak-time availability and appliance ownership
Dep. Var.: High-load electric
appliance ownership
(1)
(2)

Variables
Grid-electricity supply constraint (ref. group: < 4 hours of availability
between 6-10 PM)
Peak-time availability (4 hours of availability between 6-10
PM)

0.0309**

0.0220

(0.016)

(0.1041)

0.0031***
(0.0006)

0.0033
(0.0010)

Quintile 2 expenditures

- 0.0013
(0.0012)

- 0.0012
(0.0021)

Quintile 3 expenditures

0.0005
(0.0013)

- 0.0013
(0.0022)

Quintile 4 expenditures

- 0.0013
(0.0009)

0.0005
(0.0016)

Quintile 5 expenditures

- 0.0012***
(0.0003)

- 0.0014
(0.0006)

Total monthly expenditures (USD)
Quintile 1 expenditures

Interaction between availability and expenditures
Quintile 1 expenditures × Peak-time availability

- 0.0002
(0.0013)

Quintile 2 expenditures × Peak-time availability

- 0.0003
(0.0026)

Quintile 3 expenditures × Peak-time availability

0.0034
(0.0027)

Quintile 4 expenditures × Peak-time availability

- 0.0031
(0.0020)

Quintile 5 expenditures × Peak-time availability

0.0003
(0.0008)
YES
3,847

Controls
Observations

YES
3,847

Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. Controls include indicators for
housewife/husband, too old to work or retired, female, educational attainment, and rural-urban status.
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Table 3.8: Supply constraints and coping behavior
Backup status
Variables

No backup

Lighting only

Lighting and
appliances

- 0.0156*

- 0.0184*

0.0341*

(0.0081)

(0.0096)

(0.0176)

0.0332***

0.0393***

- 0.0726***

(0.0081)

(0.0091)

(0.0170)

- 0.0002

- 0.0003

0.0005

(0.0002)

(0.0002)

(0.0005)

- 0.0007

- 0.0009

0.0016

(0.0004)

(0.0005)

(0.0010)

0.0013**

0.0016**

- 0.0029**

(0.0005)

(0.0006)

(0.0011)

- 0.0008*

- 0.0009**

0.0017**

(0.0004)

(0.0004)

(0.0008)

0.0004***

0.0005***

- 0.0009***

(0.0001)

(0.0001)

(0.0003)

Controls

YES

YES

YES

Observations

3,847

3,847

3,847

Clusters of grid-electricity supply constraint
High availability with frequent outages

High availability without frequent outages

Total monthly expenditures (USD)
Quintile 1 expenditures

Quintile 2 expenditures

Quintile 3 expenditures

Quintile 4 expenditures

Quintile 5 expenditures

Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Figures in parentheses are robust standard errors. Controls include indicators for
housewife/husband, too old to work or retired, female, educational attainment, and rural-urban status.
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Panel A. Daily availability of grid electricity

Panel B. Frequency of outages

Panel C. Availability of grid-electricity during the evening peak time (6-10 PM)

Figure 3.1: Grid electricity supply constraints – district-level averages
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Figure 3.2: Elbow method outcome - the optimal number of clusters
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Figure 3.3: Standardized mean values of segmentation variables by cluster
Note: Variables are standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1.
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APPENDICES
I Appendix of Chapter 1: Sample Representativeness
How representative are the samples used in this study? For the household sample,
there are two other samples available with a few comparable attributes. The first one is the
sample collected by the World Bank’s Multi-Tier Framework for Measuring Energy
Access 2017. The second source is from Nepal’s National Census of 2011 (the latest
available at the time of this study). Along with most of the demographic and socioeconomic
attributes, sample statistics appear to be reasonably representative of the population at large
(see Table A1).
For the firm sample, the only available sample at the time of this study is the World
Bank’s Enterprise Survey 2013. As shown in Table A2, this study’s sample statistics are
similar to the World Bank’s collected sample.
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Table A1: How representative is the household sample?
Variables
Sample size

The sample used in
this study
(2016)
1,800

4,042

Nepal’s National
Census
(2011)
2,067,609

World Bank
(2017)

Population distribution
By urban/rural status
Urban
Rural

0.56
0.44

0.82
0.18

0.73
0.17

By ecological region
Mountain
Hill
Terai

0.02
0.58
0.40

0.10
0.50
0.40

0.05
0.47
0.48

By development Region
Eastern
Central
Western
Mid-western
Far-western

0.20
0.43
0.19
0.10
0.08

0.27
0.44
0.15
0.07
0.07

0.21
0.41
0.23
0.08
0.06

Household characteristics
No formal education
Household size

0.20
5.14

0.34
-

4.88

Coping technologies*
Inverters
Solar panel
Solar lantern
Voltage stabilizer
Candle
Kerosene

0.19
0.16
0.01
0.11
0.20
0.13

0.29
0.19
0.03
0.15
0.08
0.14

-

Notes
* Torch and emergency lights are asked under different coping technologies, so inconsistent between
surveys.
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Table A2: How representative is the firm sample?
The sample used in this study
(2016)
590

World Bank Enterprise Survey
(2013)
482

Firm location
Urban
Rural

0.81
0.19

0.79
0.21

Region of establishment
East
Central
West

0.21
0.43
0.36

0.11
0.70
0.19

Coping technology*
Diesel generator

0.68

0.54

Firm size**
Small
Medium
Large

0.46
0.38
0.16

0.60
0.27
0.13

Variables
Sample size

Notes
* The World Bank survey only asks about diesel generators’ ownership, whereas the sample used in this
study asks about a list of different coping technologies.
** The World Bank survey measures a firm’s size by the number of its employees, but the sample used in
this study measure a firm’s size by its annual turnover, the same approach used by Nepal’s Internal Revenue
Department. Given that there is a high correlation between a firm’s number of employees and its annual
turnover, these two firm size measures are used here for comparison purposes.
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II Appendix of Chapter 1: Cheap Talk Script
Table B1. Cheap Talk script used for the contingent valuation
We would like to know how much you value better quality electricity service. No one will change your
electricity tariff as a result of what you say. However, if you value electricity enough, the government
may decide to invest more in electricity and your tariff may have to increase to pay for the investment.
Some people over-estimate the amount they are willing to pay because they are frustrated by the current
situation and want the investment to happen. If many respondents provide higher estimates, then the
government could set a higher tariff for electricity which is beyond your ability to pay.
Likewise, some people underestimate the amount that they are willing to pay because they are concerned
that they already pay too much, or they lie thinking that the government will charge them less. But, if
enough people respond this way, the government will think that electricity is not important to you and
may not make additional investments in electricity improvement projects.
Please also be aware of your expenses on alternative energy sources, such as candles and kerosene, and
how your family’s budget will be affected if you no longer have to purchase so many alternatives to
electricity.
Your VDC or Municipality will be at a disadvantage whether you over-estimate or under-estimate your
willingness to pay. So, please try to be honest and tell us only what you are truly able and willing to pay
based on your income.
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